United States v. Pereneal Kizzee
877 F.3d 650
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- On Feb 4–5, 2014, police surveilled 963 Trinity Cut Off Drive, observed Carl Brown briefly speak with Pereneal Kizzee, then stopped Brown and found 0.54 g crack; Brown was interviewed by Detective Schultz at the station and (according to Schultz) said he bought the drugs from Kizzee.
- Schultz relied on Brown’s statements to obtain a search warrant; the search recovered 0.2 g crack in the house, cash, rifles, ammunition, cell phones linking Brown and Kizzee, and other items but little corroborating drug-distribution evidence.
- At trial the prosecutor asked Schultz about the specific questions he asked Brown; Schultz answered that he asked those questions (and testified he obtained a warrant after the interview). Defense objected on hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds; the court overruled.
- A jury convicted Kizzee on three counts: felon-in-possession (§ 922(g)(1)), possession with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841), and § 924(c) gun-in-relation-to-drug-trafficking; sentence 130 months. Kizzee appealed.
- The Fifth Circuit held that the prosecutor’s questioning and Schultz’s answers permitted the jury to infer Brown’s out-of-court, testimonial statements identifying Kizzee as his drug source, admitting testimonial hearsay without Brown’s cross-examination.
- The court concluded the Confrontation Clause violation was not harmless for counts 2 and 3 (drug-distribution and § 924(c)), vacated those convictions, and remanded for a new trial; the § 922(g) conviction remained intact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutor’s questioning and officer testimony admitted testimonial out-of-court statements in violation of the Sixth Amendment | Kizzee: prosecutor’s questions and Schultz’s answers implicitly communicated Brown’s testimonial inculpatory statements and deprived Kizzee of confrontation | Government: no testimonial hearsay was introduced; Schultz only testified to his observations and actions; Brown’s statements were not offered for their truth | Held: Yes — the questioning/testimony permitted the jury to infer Brown’s testimonial statements identifying Kizzee, triggering Confrontation Clause protections |
| Whether the statements were offered for their truth (i.e., used to prove guilt) | Kizzee: testimony was used to show Kizzee was Brown’s drug source and to support intent-to-distribute and § 924(c) counts | Government: testimony only explained why officers obtained a warrant and described Schultz’s conduct; not offered for truth | Held: The testimony exceeded permissible background and was offered for its truth — it implicated Kizzee and was unnecessary to explain investigative acts |
| Whether the Confrontation Clause was cured by opportunity to cross-examine or witness availability | Kizzee: defense had no prior opportunity to cross-examine Brown and should not be required to call the prosecution’s witness | Government: Brown was available and the defense could have subpoenaed him; Schultz was cross-examined | Held: No cure — Brown was not unavailable, and the possibility that the defense could call him does not constitute a prior opportunity to cross-examine; Schultz’s testimony cannot substitute for Brown’s cross-examination |
| Whether the Confrontation Clause error was harmless | Kizzee: error was not harmless because Brown’s statements were central and no other direct evidence linked Kizzee to selling drugs | Government: prosecution argued error did not affect substantial rights | Held: Not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for counts 2 and 3 — Brown’s statements were important and not sufficiently corroborated by other evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (testimonial statements to police require confrontation)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (police interrogations produce testimonial statements)
- Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (out-of-court statements may be used for non-truth purposes but Confrontation Clause applies when used for truth)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard)
- Taylor v. Cain, 545 F.3d 327 (5th Cir.) (officer testimony recounting statements that inculpate defendant can trigger Confrontation Clause)
- Favre v. Henderson, 464 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.) (inference from officer testimony that informant implicated defendant triggers Confrontation protections)
- Johnston v. United States, 127 F.3d 380 (5th Cir.) (prosecutor questioning can introduce inadmissible out-of-court accusations)
- Duron–Caldera v. United States, 737 F.3d 988 (5th Cir.) (defendant’s burden and harmless-error framework for Confrontation Clause claims)
- Polidore v. United States, 690 F.3d 705 (5th Cir.) (preservation and standard of review for Confrontation Clause claims)
