991 F.3d 1
1st Cir.2021Background
- Dec 14, 2016: Federal grand jury in Puerto Rico returned an indictment charging Juan R. Pedró-Vidal with multiple counts, including death-eligible offenses.
- Local Criminal Rule 144A required the government to file a notice of intent to seek death within 180 days of indictment and to allow early appointment of learned counsel and a pre-authorization presentation to the Attorney General's Capital Review Committee.
- The district court promptly identified the case as potentially capital and appointed learned counsel; defense counsel sought and obtained preparation time for the committee presentation, which occurred after the 180-day deadline.
- The Attorney General later certified the death penalty and the government filed its Death Notice on June 28, 2018, beyond the 180-day period.
- Pedró-Vidal moved to strike the Death Notice, arguing violation of Local Rule 144A and that the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) does not apply to Puerto Rican residents; the district court denied the motions and Pedró-Vidal appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Pedró-Vidal) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of Death Notice under Local Criminal Rule 144A | Early identification and prompt appointment of learned counsel fulfilled the rule's purpose; any delay caused no prejudice | Untimely Death Notice violated the Local Rule and requires striking the notice | Denied. No prejudice shown; district court's early actions satisfied the rule's purposes; no evidentiary hearing required |
| Applicability of the FDPA to Puerto Rico residents | FDPA applies uniformly; precedent binds the court | FDPA application violates substantive due process and consent of the governed, and raised equal protection concerns | Denied. Court followed controlling precedent (Acosta-Martínez); FDPA applies to Puerto Rican residents |
| Appealability / jurisdictional relief (collateral order / mandamus) | Government urged the court to resolve merits and noted jurisdictional framework; opposed mandamus which was not timely raised | Argued denial of motion to strike was immediately appealable; alternatively sought mandamus | Court bypassed the statutory appealability question and reached the merits; mandamus argument waived for being raised too late |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Acosta-Martínez, 252 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2001) (refusing to strike death-notice absent prejudice and likening striking to dismissing indictment)
- United States v. López-Matías, 522 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2008) (review standard and prejudice requirement for striking a Death Notice)
- Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (prejudice required to dismiss indictment)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (speedy trial balancing test)
- Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (framework for collateral order doctrine cited)
- Sosa v. Álvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (international treaties like the ICCPR do not create privately enforceable federal rights)
- United States v. Ferebe, 332 F.3d 722 (4th Cir. 2003) (held denial of motion to strike Death Notice appealable under collateral order doctrine)
- United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 487 (2d Cir. 2007) (reached opposite conclusion on collateral order appealability)
- United States v. Ayala-López, 457 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2006) (permitting bypass of jurisdictional question to decide merits)
- Sinapi v. R.I. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 910 F.3d 544 (1st Cir. 2018) (guidance on bypassing statutory jurisdictional issues)