United States v. Pedro Hernandez-Quintania, 874 F.3d 1123

Defendant Pedro Hernandez-Quintania, a Mexican citizen, had a 2014 conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for illegal reentry, received 10 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised release, and was removed to Mexico in April 2015.
On January 9, 2016 Border Patrol found Hernandez-Quintania in Dulzura, CA without documents; he was charged with illegal reentry under § 1326 and proceeded to jury trial.
Government introduced evidence of prior deportations (July 23, 2013 and April 15, 2015), a DHS Form I-296 warning requiring permission to reapply after removal, and A-file checks showing no request/consent to reapply after the 2015 removal.
Defendant argued the government failed to prove he lacked "consent of the Attorney General" to reapply, contending an earlier (2004) application might have been granted and insulated him from prosecution.
Defendant also raised a Batson challenge, asserting the government impermissibly used peremptory strikes to remove two apparent minority jurors.
Conviction was returned by the jury; district court revoked supervised release on that basis. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on both the sufficiency and Batson issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of proof that defendant lacked consent to reapply under § 1326	Govt: Evidence of most recent 2015 removal, DHS I-296, and A-file checks showing no post-2015 consent sufficed	Hernandez: Govt failed to prove he never obtained Attorney General consent because of an unresolved 2004 application	Court: Affirmed — statute requires consent after the most recent deportation; evidence permitted a rational jury to find no consent post-2015
Statutory scope of "consent to reapply" under § 1326	Govt: Consent must occur after the most recent removal to bar prosecution	Hernandez: Any earlier consent (e.g., 2004) would permanently shield him regardless of later removals	Court: Affirmed govt view — consent must be given after the last deportation to avoid § 1326 liability
Batson prima facie showing	Govt: No discriminatory pattern; empaneled jury included multiple minorities; defense provided no additional circumstances	Hernandez: Striking two apparent minority jurors warranted a prima facie inference of discrimination	Court: Affirmed denial — defendant failed to make a prima facie showing; totality of circumstances did not raise an inference of racial motivation
Supervised release revocation	Govt: Revocation follows from new § 1326 conviction	Hernandez: Challenges revocation only insofar as § 1326 conviction invalid	Court: Affirmed revocation, since conviction was upheld

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370 (9th Cir.) (applies Jackson standard)
United States v. Cabral, 252 F.3d 520 (1st Cir.) (interpretation that consent must be post-deportation)
United States v. Angeles-Mascote, 206 F.3d 529 (5th Cir.) (same interpretation)
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (framework forbidding race-based peremptory strikes)
Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (addresses Batson three-step process and evaluation)
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (clarifies Batson burden-shifting and prima facie considerations)