United States v. Pease
2016 CAAF LEXIS 235
| C.A.A.F. | 2016Background
- Appellee Jacob L. Pease, a Navy IT2, supervised two female sailors and engaged in sexual activity with them after they had consumed large amounts of alcohol; he was convicted at general court-martial of fraternization, abusive sexual contact, and sexual assault.
- The military judge instructed the panel that the Government must prove the victims were “incapable of consenting … due to impairment by an intoxicant” and that Appellee knew or reasonably should have known of that condition; he did not define “incapable of consenting.”
- During deliberations, members asked for a definition of “competent”; the judge told them to apply the plain meaning (no statutory definition provided), and the panel convicted on the Article 120 offenses.
- The Navy-Marine Corps CCA conducted an Article 66(c) factual-sufficiency review, defined four Article 120 terms (competent; incompetent; freely given agreement; incapable of consenting), and concluded the evidence was factually insufficient to support the Article 120 convictions, dismissing those specifications.
- The Judge Advocate General certified two questions to this Court: (1) whether the CCA improperly considered definitions not given to the members or matters outside the record in its factual-sufficiency review; and (2) whether the CCA’s definition of “incapable of consenting” unlawfully narrowed Article 120 or raised the Government’s burden of proof.
- This Court reviewed the certified questions de novo and ultimately affirmed the CCA, holding the CCA acted within its Article 66(c) authority and applied an appropriate definition of “incapable of consenting” (noting a non-prejudicial scrivener’s error).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the CCA improperly used definitions not given to the members or considered matters outside the trial record during Article 66(c) factual-sufficiency review | CCA exceeded its authority by considering legal definitions and thereby relying on matters outside the members’ instructions/record | CCA may determine correct legal definitions as part of its limited, de novo factual-sufficiency review of the trial record | Held: CCA acted within Article 66(c); defining statutory terms is permissible when applying law to facts based on the trial record |
| Whether CCA’s definition of “incapable of consenting” improperly narrowed prosecutions by limiting incapacity to (1) inability to appreciate or (2) inability to make and communicate a decision | CCA’s definition restricts prosecutions and increases Government’s burden by requiring both inability to make AND to communicate a decision | CCA’s definition reflects ordinary meaning and statutory context; any phrasing error was a scrivener’s mistake and did not affect outcome | Held: CCA’s definition is legally sound; it should read “make or to communicate,” but CCA applied the correct “or” standard in analysis, so no reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Paul, 73 M.J. 274 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (de novo review of legal questions)
- United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (Article 66(c) factual-sufficiency review requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
- United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1987) (standards for factual-sufficiency review)
- United States v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (CCA limited to evidence presented at trial)
- United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (application of law to facts must be based on a correct view of the law)
- United States v. Schloff, 74 M.J. 312 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (statutory interpretation: ordinary meaning, context, and broader statutory scheme)
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (principles for interpreting statutory language)