United States v. Pease
2015 CCA LEXIS 286
| N.M.C.C.A. | 2015Background
- Appellant Jacob L. Pease, IT2, convicted at general court-martial of fraternization (affirmed) and multiple sexual assaults/abusive sexual contact (set aside as factually insufficient); sentence (6 years confinement, dishonorable discharge) approved but sentence set aside for rehearing on sentence after convictions changed.
- Two complainants (ITSN S.K. and IT2 B.S.), both junior sailors supervised by appellant, alleged separate incidents of sexual assault after nights out in Gaeta, Italy; both reported fragmented memory and significant alcohol consumption.
- Shore patrol personnel encountered and ordered both complainants back to ship; witnesses observed each walking and interacting coherently with others while returning; no BAC tests were taken and timelines/amounts of alcohol were uncertain.
- Government and defense presented competing expert testimony on alcohol effects, blackout vs. pass-out, and functional capacity to consent; experts agreed blackout can involve functioning without memory formation.
- Trial members convicted; on appeal the Navy–Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals conducted de novo factual sufficiency review under Article 66(c), UCMJ, and concluded the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either complainant was legally "incapable of consenting" or that appellant knew or reasonably should have known of such incapacity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether MR. Evid. 413 was properly applied to charged misconduct | Government relied on propensity evidence to prove sexual offenses | Appellant argued improper use of prior-bad-act evidence | Mooted by sufficiency ruling (not reached on merits) |
| 2. Legal and factual sufficiency of sexual-assault and abusive-contact convictions | Government: complainants were incapacitated by alcohol; appellant knew or should have known | Appellant: complainants retained capacity to consent; insufficient proof of incapacity/knowledge | Convictions for sexual assault/contact are factually insufficient and set aside |
| 3. Failure to give a requested jury instruction | Appellant contended instruction necessary for fair deliberations | Government opposed or disputed necessity | Mooted by sufficiency ruling (not reached on merits) |
| 4. Challenge that Article 120 is unconstitutionally vague | Appellant argued vagueness of incapacity standard | Government defended statute and prosecution under existing definitions | Mooted by sufficiency ruling (not decided) |
| 5. Admission of expert testimony on alcohol effects | Government supported admissibility of experts explaining intoxication effects | Appellant claimed expert testimony was improper or prejudicial | Mooted by sufficiency ruling (not addressed on appeal) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Clifton, 35 M.J. 79 (C.M.A. 1992) (standard for reviewing fraternization convictions)
- United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (de novo factual sufficiency review under Article 66(c))
- United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1987) (test for factual sufficiency: convinced beyond a reasonable doubt)
- United States v. Goode, 54 M.J. 836 (N.M.Ct.Crim.App. 2001) (evidence may conflict yet still support conviction)
- Ron Pair Enters. v. United States, 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (interpret statute by plain language when coherent)
- United States v. Riley, 58 M.J. 305 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (setting aside sentence when convictions change materially)