United States v. Peake
874 F.3d 65
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- Between 2002–2008 Sea Star and Horizon engaged in a price‑fixing/market‑allocation conspiracy affecting Puerto Rico and interstate commerce; Peake became Sea Star COO/president and joined the conspiracy in 2005.
- At Peake’s 2013 nine‑day trial the government presented cooperating witnesses (Serra, Glova, Baci), emails, phone and travel records showing Peake’s leadership role; Peake presented no witnesses and argued lack of knowing participation.
- The jury convicted Peake of conspiracy under the Sherman Act; this court previously affirmed the conviction (Peake I).
- After trial, Peake learned that cooperator William Stallings had filed a qui tam FCA action (filed Jan 15, 2013), which was later unsealed and settled; Peake claimed the government failed to disclose that filing.
- Peake moved for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 based on newly discovered evidence/Brady violation; the district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding no cognizable prejudice given the overwhelming independent evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Peake) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't/District Ct) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did nondisclosure of Stallings’s qui tam filing violate Brady and warrant a new trial under Rule 33? | The undisclosed qui tam filing was favorable/impeaching and, if known, would have led Peake to call Stallings and use the complaint to undercut the government’s case. | The withheld filing would not have changed the outcome: the information was cumulative or already available (recordings, witnesses, incriminating references in the qui tam), and no cognizable prejudice shown. | Affirmed: no Brady prejudice; Rule 33 relief denied. |
| Was an evidentiary hearing required on Peake’s Rule 33 motion? | A hearing was needed to explore what the government knew and to develop evidentiary support for the Brady claim. | The motion was conclusively refuted by the record, so a hearing would have been futile. | Affirmed: no abuse of discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing. |
| Can a post‑verdict change in law (Sanchez‑Valle) be used as newly discovered evidence under Rule 33 to challenge application of the Sherman Act to Puerto Rico? | (alternative) Sanchez‑Valle suggests Puerto Rico is not a separate sovereign, so the Sherman Act’s ‘‘among the several States’’ framing undermines application to Puerto Rico. | Rule 33 requires newly discovered evidence; a change in law is not newly discovered evidence and the trial evidence showed commerce among the states as well. | Rejected: procedural default and substantively without merit; conviction stands. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Peake, 804 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 2015) (prior appeal affirming conviction and factual findings)
- United States v. Connolly, 504 F.3d 206 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining Brady framework and Rule 33 interplay)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (materiality standard for undisclosed evidence that undermines confidence in outcome)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (U.S. 1985) (Brady/Bagley standard on favorable/impeaching evidence)
- United States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d 498 (1st Cir. 2010) (deference to district court’s assessment of prejudice and strategic options)
- Teamsters v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1992) (issues not raised below generally forfeited on appeal)