United States v. Paz-Alvarez
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14717
| 1st Cir. | 2015Background
- In 2009 Irizarry and Retamar organized maritime cocaine smuggling using vessels Sheymarie and Such Is Life; they commissioned Paz and his assistant Marrero to build sophisticated hidden compartments ("clavos") to conceal large quantities of cocaine.
- Paz and Marrero attended planning meetings, built clavos on both boats, and were told the compartments would hold large drug loads; one meeting was recorded by an informant.
- Law enforcement later seized the Such Is Life during a sting and discovered sophisticated clavos containing 150 kg of cocaine; Retamar cooperated with the government.
- A grand jury indicted Paz and Marrero for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to import cocaine; a jury convicted both and found the conspiracy involved more than 5 kg.
- Paz was sentenced using a Guidelines base offense level reflecting >150 kg and received a two-level enhancement for using a "special skill;" Marrero received a reduced Guidelines range but a statutory 120-month mandatory minimum triggered by the jury finding >5 kg.
- Both defendants appealed: joint challenges to jury instructions (mens rea for conspiracy and whether drug-quantity finding required proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Paz also challenged sufficiency of the evidence and the special-skill enhancement; Marrero raised an as-applied vagueness challenge, hearsay/Petrozziello issues and variance, and cumulative error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy of intent (mens rea) jury instruction for conspiracy | Gov't: instruction correctly required knowing, willful participation and intent that the conspiracy succeed | Paz & Marrero: instruction failed to state explicitly the two-pronged intent (intent to join AND intent to further conspiracy), permitting conviction on knowledge alone | Court: instruction substantially covered the two-pronged intent ("willfully joined" and "specific intent that the conspiracy be successful"); no reversible error |
| Whether drug-quantity finding was required to be decided beyond a reasonable doubt | Gov't: overall instructions conveyed reasonable-doubt standard and jury returned quantity finding during initial verdict deliberations | Defs: court failed to tie drug-quantity question explicitly to reasonable doubt when reading the verdict form, violating Alleyne/Apprendi | Court: reviewing instructions as a whole, reasonable-doubt standard was sufficiently emphasized and the quantity question was part of the original deliberation; no constitutional error |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Paz knowingly joined and intended to further the conspiracy | Gov't: meetings, building of multiple clavos for drug-smuggling boats, and secret-keeping conduct show intent to join and further conspiracy | Paz: he was a contractor performing limited work orders, indifferent to success, not a conspirator | Court: circumstantial evidence (planning meetings, sophisticated concealment, guarding secrets) supports a rational jury finding Paz knowingly joined and intended to further the conspiracy; conviction affirmed |
| Application of U.S.S.G. §3B1.3 (special skill) to Paz | Gov't: Paz's workmanship (carpentry, electrical/hydraulics, custom mechanism) required skills beyond lay public and materially concealed contraband | Paz: construction was limited (covering cavities) and not a "special skill" as meant by the Guidelines | Court: factual finding not clearly erroneous—clavo mechanisms were sophisticated and concealed contraband; two-level enhancement affirmed |
| Marrero's as-applied vagueness/fair-warning challenge to conspiracy statutes | Gov't: statutes and controlling case law (defining knowing, voluntary participation) provided fair notice | Marrero: building compartments for illegal use did not clearly put him on notice he could be a conspirator | Court: statutes, read with precedent, give fair warning that knowingly providing services with intent to further a drug conspiracy can incur criminal liability; challenge fails |
| Admission of co-conspirator hearsay and alleged variance/spillover | Gov't: Petrozziello ruling was supported by preponderance evidence of a single conspiracy; contested statement was in furtherance | Marrero: admission included hearsay about unrelated conspiracies and produced prejudicial variance | Court: co-conspirator statement admission was supported; evidence showed a single ongoing conspiracy (common goal, participant overlap, interdependence); no prejudicial variance; objection reviewed for clear error and failed |
| Cumulative error claim | Gov't: arguments were not properly preserved or developed | Marrero: incorporates multiple motions by reference and alleges cumulative error | Court: incorporation by reference is insufficient; arguments undeveloped and waived; no cumulative-error relief |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rodríguez-Soler, 773 F.3d 289 (1st Cir. 2014) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. 2011) (elements of conspiracy explained)
- United States v. Gonzalez, 570 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2009) (intent-to-join requirement discussion)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (omission of an element from jury instruction is not structural error)
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (any fact increasing mandatory minimum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) (review of jury instructions requires assessing reasonable likelihood of misapplication)
- United States v. Burgos, 703 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (distinguishing indifference from membership in a conspiracy)
- United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167 (1st Cir. 2014) (instructional error where quantity decision occurred after initial verdict)
- United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2012) (Petrozziello standard; preponderance for co-conspirator statements)
- United States v. García-Torres, 280 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) (peripheral services can support conspiracy liability)
