United States v. Paulo Lara
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3995
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Paulo Lara was on probation for a nonviolent drug offense and signed a probation condition consenting to warrantless, suspicionless searches of “person and property, including any residence, premises, container or vehicle.”
- Probation officers visited Lara after a missed appointment, seized his cell phone without a warrant or explicit permission, and reviewed recent text messages and photos.
- Officers found photos of a handgun on the phone; lab examiners extracted GPS metadata from the images identifying Lara’s mother’s address.
- Officers searched the mother’s home and seized a loaded handgun matching the photos; Lara was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- The district court denied Lara’s suppression motion; after Riley v. California was decided, Lara appealed, preserving the Fourth Amendment challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Lara) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lara waived Fourth Amendment protection by accepting probation search condition | Probation term consented to suspicionless searches, including cell phone search | Acceptance of term does not by itself waive all Fourth Amendment protections; searches must still be reasonable | Waiver by signing probation condition is not dispositive; it’s only one factor in reasonableness analysis |
| Whether warrantless, suspicionless searches of Lara’s cell phone were reasonable | Probation status and drug conviction justify suspicionless cell-phone search | Cell-phone data are highly private; search-condition language did not unambiguously authorize searching phone data | Search was unreasonable under balancing test; cell-phone searches require greater protection per Riley |
| Whether pre-Riley precedent justified officers’ reliance such that exclusionary rule should not apply (Davis good-faith) | Officers reasonably relied on existing case law, so evidence should not be suppressed under Davis | No clear, binding appellate precedent specifically authorizing suspicionless probation cell-phone searches; Davis doesn’t apply | Davis inapplicable—no binding precedent authorizing these searches; good-faith exception denied |
| Whether evidence (phone data, GPS, gun) should be suppressed as fruits of unlawful search | Evidence admissible because search lawful or officers relied on precedent | Evidence is fruit of an unlawful search and must be excluded | Evidence suppressed; conviction reversal and remand for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Consuelo–Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (probation search condition does not automatically waive Fourth Amendment; searches must be reasonable)
- Knights v. United States, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (reasonableness of probation search judged by totality of circumstances, including clear search condition)
- Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (cell phones hold vast private data; warrant generally required to search digital contents)
- United States v. King, 736 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2013) (upheld suspicionless search under probation condition for violent felon; limited to violent-felon context)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (probationers’ privacy expectations are diminished but not eliminated)
- United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2014) (cell phones differ from ordinary containers; limits on searching phone data)
- Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (good-faith reliance on binding appellate precedent can preclude suppression)
- Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (limits on vehicle searches incident to arrest; illustrates how later rulings can change precedent)