United States v. Paul Torres, III, 995 F.3d 695

Paul Torres III was arrested Aug. 26, 2019, on federal methamphetamine and felon-in-possession charges and has been detained pending trial under the Bail Reform Act as a flight risk/danger.
Trial was scheduled for Oct. 22, 2019, then continued twice by stipulation (to Apr. 7, 2020), and later repeatedly continued because of COVID-19 jury suspensions and court general orders.
The district court granted multiple continuances under the Speedy Trial Act’s ends-of-justice provision, excluding those periods from the trial clock; it also treated those exclusions as tolling the 90-day pretrial-detention clock under 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b).
Torres moved repeatedly for release, arguing (1) an ends-of-justice continuance that delays trial should not automatically toll the § 3164 detention clock and (2) due process forbids his lengthy pretrial detention (approaching 21 months).
The district court denied release; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (a) § 3164(b) plainly incorporates § 3161(h) exclusions and (b) Torres’s detention, though lengthy and troubling, did not yet violate due process.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Torres)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether § 3161(h)(7) ends-of-justice continuances that toll the 70-day trial clock must also toll the 90-day pretrial-detention clock in § 3164(b).	Ends-of-justice analysis is context-specific; a continuance that extends pretrial detention requires a different, detention-focused analysis and should not automatically toll § 3164.	§ 3164(b)’s plain text incorporates the § 3161(h) tolling provisions; furthermore § 3161(h)(7) already requires courts to consider the defendant’s interest in a speedy trial (including detention status).	Affirmed: § 3164(b) unambiguously excludes delays enumerated in § 3161(h); courts must consider detained status in the § 3161(h)(7) analysis, so no separate § 3164 analysis is required.
Whether Torres’s prolonged pretrial detention violates due process.	The length (about 21 months if tried in May 2021) and indefinite delay make the detention punitive and unconstitutional.	Delays are attributable to COVID-19 and defense stipulations; prosecution is not at fault; strong evidence and Bail Reform Act findings support continued detention (danger/flight risk).	Affirmed: No due process violation yet. The detention is lengthy and approaching constitutional limits; court must try Torres or reevaluate bail promptly if further delay occurs.

United States v. Lewis, 980 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1992) (treated § 3161(h) exclusions as excluded from § 3164’s 90-day clock)
United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir. 1986) (held ends-of-justice tolling may require different consideration for detention; ordered release or trial)
Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (describes Speedy Trial Act’s list of excludable delays)
Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010) (addressed Speedy Trial Act tolling doctrines and abrogated some earlier authority on other grounds)
Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (distinguishes regulatory pretrial detention from punitive detention in due process analysis)
United States v. Gelfuso, 838 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopts case-by-case approach to due process challenge to prolonged pretrial detention)
United States v. Myers, 930 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2019) (delays approaching one year are presumptively prejudicial for speedy-trial purposes)
Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355 (2019) (reinforces interpreting statutes by plain text)
Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016) (explains Speedy Trial Act’s role in protecting presumptively innocent defendants)