United States v. Paul, 2014 CAAF LEXIS 575

Airman Charles W. Paul was tried by a military judge and convicted, contrary to his plea, of wrongfully using 3,4‑methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) — charged as a Schedule I controlled substance commonly called "ecstasy." Sentence included a bad‑conduct discharge, confinement, and reduction in rank.
Prosecution evidence: eyewitness Holly Kern testified she saw Paul ingest what she believed was ecstasy on two occasions and described pills and effects; text messages from Paul referred to "E," "rolling," and "rolls."
The Government did not introduce proof at trial that (a) the substance Paul used was chemically 3,4‑methylenedioxymethamphetamine, (b) that the term "ecstasy" denotes that chemical, or (c) that the term "ecstasy" appears on any Presidentially‑prescribed schedule for Article 112a purposes.
The military judge took judicial notice of an unrelated general order (about spice) but did not take judicial notice that "ecstasy" equals MDMA or that MDMA is Schedule I.
The Air Force CCA affirmed, but sua sponte took judicial notice on appeal that ecstasy is a Schedule I controlled substance under U.S. law and said it would have taken such notice at trial.
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed the ecstasy conviction and dismissed that specification, holding the Government failed to prove an essential element and the CCA erred in taking judicial notice of an element not proven at trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (United States)	Defendant's Argument (Paul)	Held
Was the trial evidence legally sufficient to prove Paul used a Schedule I controlled substance (MDMA)?	The evidence that Paul used "ecstasy" (eyewitness description + texts) sufficed to prove he used MDMA, a Schedule I drug.	The Government failed to prove the substance was MDMA or that the common term "ecstasy" is legally a Schedule I substance; thus an essential element was missing.	Evidence was legally insufficient; no rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Paul used a Schedule I substance.
Could the Air Force CCA take judicial notice on appeal that "ecstasy" is a Schedule I controlled substance and thereby cure the trial deficiency?	CCA can judicially notice domestic law; doing so on appeal corrects the omission.	Taking judicial notice of an element on appeal deprives defendant of notice and opportunity to challenge — violates due process.	CCA erred: an appellate court may not judicially notice an element of the offense not established at trial; defendant must have the element proved or judicial notice taken at trial with opportunity to be heard.

Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (court may not, on appeal, judicially notice facts that effectively substitute for proof at trial; due‑process notice and opportunity to be heard required)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (legal‑sufficiency standard: evidence must allow any rational trier of fact to find every element beyond a reasonable doubt)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (government must prove every element of offense beyond a reasonable doubt)
Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973) (Supreme Court may take judicial notice of indisputable facts in the appellate context)
United States v. Williams, 17 M.J. 207 (C.M.A. 1984) (appellate courts may take judicial notice of indisputable facts but may not assume trial court took judicial notice absent record indication)
United States v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (review of findings is limited to evidence presented at trial; appellate relief cannot rest on facts outside the trial record)