651 F. App'x 423
6th Cir.2016Background
- In 2013 Amos Patton, a Tennessee National Guard recruiter, returned to the Millington Armory with a 9mm pistol after being demoted and fired shots that wounded three officers; he was subdued in the parking lot and arrested.
- A federal grand jury indicted Patton on nine counts: four counts of assault with intent to commit murder (18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1)), four counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3)), and one § 924(c) firearm count; a jury convicted on all counts.
- Patton challenged subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing the shootings occurred on land under Tennessee’s exclusive jurisdiction, not the United States’ special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
- He also moved to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act, claiming the court failed to make timely ends-of-justice findings for a continuance, and later contested a $6,640.50 restitution award that included spouses’ lost wages.
- The district court relied on a retrocession agreement establishing concurrent jurisdiction over the Armory, entered post-hoc but timely ends-of-justice findings supporting continuances for mental-evaluation time, and adopted a restitution amount without separating medical expenses from spousal lost wages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Territorial jurisdiction (special maritime & territorial jurisdiction) | Patton: shootings occurred on land under Tennessee’s exclusive jurisdiction, so federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. | Government: retrocession agreement established concurrent jurisdiction; therefore the United States had jurisdiction and prosecution valid. | Court: Concurrent jurisdiction existed under the retrocession agreement; federal jurisdiction proper; conviction affirmed. |
| Standard of review for jurisdictional finding | Patton: subject-matter jurisdiction reviewed de novo. | Government: jury-found element => Jackson sufficiency review applies. | Court: Unnecessary to choose; Patton loses under either standard. |
| Speedy Trial Act — ends-of-justice continuance | Patton: court failed to make contemporaneous ends-of-justice findings (so 57 days should be non-excludable, making trial untimely). | Government: district court articulated reasons at the hearing (time for mental evaluation) and later entered findings before ruling on the § 3162(d) motion to dismiss. | Court: Ends-of-justice findings were timely placed on the record by ruling; reasons were permissible and not post-hoc invention; no Speedy Trial Act violation. |
| Restitution under MVRA | Patton: spouses are not "victims" who suffered bodily injury; MVRA does not permit reimbursement for family members’ lost wages. | Government/district court: awarded $6,640.50 including spouses’ lost wages and medical-related expenses as restitution. | Court: Spousal lost wages not recoverable under MVRA; award vacated and remanded to separate and, if supported, restore recoverable medical expenses only. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency-of-the-evidence review)
- Gabrion v. United States, 517 F.3d 839 (discussion of jurisdiction and standards)
- Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (timing for recording ends-of-justice findings under the Speedy Trial Act)
- Wilcox v. United States, 487 F.3d 1163 (MVRA does not permit lost-wage restitution for family members who were not bodily-injury victims)
- Brown v. United States, 819 F.3d 800 (courts must not invent after-the-fact reasons for continuances)
- Richardson v. United States, 681 F.3d 736 (district court need not contemporaneously state reasons so long as they appear by the ruling on the Speedy Trial motion)
- Evers v. United States, 669 F.3d 645 (discussing Wilcox and MVRA limits on family-member reimbursement)