25 F.4th 123
2d Cir.2022Background
- On Jan. 30, 2019 a ShopRite customer called 911 saying two Black men in a black/dark-gray Camaro had menaced her with a handgun and might be en route to a named address.
- State and county dispatchers broadcast that description; officers later spotted a dark Camaro leaving the ShopRite and followed it onto Route 6.
- Officers stopped the Camaro at a Mobil station, parked behind it, drew and pointed firearms, announced commands by PA/shouting, and blocked the vehicle’s rear exit.
- The passenger exited first and complied; Patterson (driver) delayed, appeared to reach inside the car, exited, then fled; officers chased and later arrested him; while he fled or after, officers opened the glove box and seized a loaded Makarov pistol.
- The district court suppressed the pistol as fruit of a de facto arrest that lacked probable cause; the government appealed.
- The Second Circuit reversed: it held the initial seizure was a lawful Terry investigatory stop supported by reasonable suspicion, the force used was reasonable under the circumstances, and the vehicle search was supported by probable cause under the automobile exception.
Issues
| Issue | Government's Argument | Patterson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the vehicle stop was a lawful investigatory stop or an arrest | Stop was a Terry stop supported by reasonable suspicion from victim report + vehicle match | Officers’ drawn/pointed guns and orders converted the stop into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause | Stop was a lawful Terry investigatory stop (not an arrest) because reasonable suspicion existed at inception |
| Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the Camaro | Yes — identified victim, description (two Black men, black/dark Camaro), car seen leaving scene shortly after dispatch | Description/location/timing were too imprecise to support reasonable suspicion | Reasonable suspicion existed to stop and investigate the vehicle |
| Whether the manner/force (guns drawn/pointed, blocked rear exit, shouted orders) transformed the stop into an arrest | Force was reasonable given an ongoing investigation of menacing with a firearm and risks posed while occupants remained in the car | The degree of force exceeded what Terry allows and thus amounted to an arrest | Use of force was reasonable and proportional to the threat; did not convert the stop into an arrest |
| Whether the warrantless search of the Camaro was supported by probable cause | Probable cause existed (matching car, timing, furtive movements, occupants matched description, flight) so automobile exception applied | Search lacked probable cause because identity and connection to the reported crime were not established before search | Search was supported by probable cause under the automobile exception; seizure lawful |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes investigatory stop and weapons-frisk standards)
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (reasonable-suspicion and probable-cause analysis informed by totality of circumstances)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (totality-of-the-circumstances approach to probable cause)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (probable cause not a high bar; focus on degree of suspicion from conduct)
- Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020) (reasonable-suspicion context may rely on probabilistic inferences)
- United States v. Weaver, 9 F.4th 129 (2d Cir. 2021) (en banc) (clarifies reasonable-suspicion standard and application to vehicle stops)
- United States v. Bailey, 743 F.3d 322 (2d Cir. 2014) (Terry-stop limits and when force/handcuffing may convert stop into arrest)
- United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholds use of restraints/force during a stop when officer safety and risk of weapons justify them)