United States v. Patrick Brown Thunder
745 F.3d 870
8th Cir.2014Background
- Thunder, 26, was convicted after a jury trial of sexual abuse of a minor and sexual abuse of a person incapable of consenting; district court imposed concurrent 180- and 240-month terms.
- Three minor girls (A.C., H.C., T.C.) consumed whiskey; H.C. was taken by Thunder and assaulted.
- High Bear identified Thunder with H.C. in Thunder’s car, leading to investigation and follow-up; H.C. presented injuries and a two-centimeter vaginal laceration.
- DNA from Thunder’s car seat matched H.C.’s blood; medical evidence showed injuries consistent with sexual assault, not necessarily semen.
- Thunder sought to introduce Speker’s prior sexual abuse conviction to show alternative perpetrator; district court limited inquiry to law-enforcement investigation sufficiency.
- Thunder moved for acquittal post-verdict arguing insufficiency of evidence for H.C.’s abuse and exclusion of Speker evidence; motions denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court properly refused Thunder’s theory-of-defense instruction | Government argues the overall instructions adequately conveyed defenses; no explicit alibi instruction needed | Thunder contends the requested theory-of-defense instruction was necessary to present his defenses | No abuse of discretion; instructions, taken as a whole, adequately submitted issues |
| Sufficiency of evidence for H.C.’s sexual abuse | Government contends the evidence showed opportunity, incriminating injuries, and presence in Thunder’s car | Thunder argues no reasonable jury could find contact was with him (hand/finger/object) beyond possible penile contact | Sufficient evidence; reasonable jury could find sexual act by hand/finger/object given injuries and circumstances |
| Admission of Speker prior sexual-abuse conviction evidence | Government argues Speker evidence is probative only for law-enforcement investigation credibility | Thunder claims Speker evidence would prove Speker’s guilt; risk of confusion and prejudice | Exclusion upheld; Rule 403 balance and lack of opportunity evidence support exclusion |
| Whether evidence location (Indian country) supports §1153(a) jurisdiction for H.C.’s assault | Government asserts acts occurred within Indian country, supported by location and missing shoe | Thunder argues lack of explicit admission proves otherwise | Jurisdiction established; evidence and admission support Indian country venue |
| Whether the penis-as-object issue affects sufficiency analysis under 2246(2)(C) | Government relies on standard of review; body of evidence suffices | Thunder contends lack of certainty about type of sexual act undermines conviction | Conviction affirmed under the “very strict” standard; hand/finger/object supported by evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Ironi, 525 F.3d 683 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard for evaluating jury instructions in reviewing abuse of discretion)
- United States v. Hayes, 518 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2008) (broad discretion in jury instruction formulation; substantial compliance acceptable)
- United States v. Christy, 647 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2011) (theory-of-defense instruction not required if other instructions cover defenses)
- United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314 (8th Cir. 1995) (adequate to address substance of defense theory in closing)
- United States v. Kenyon, 397 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2005) (proof of speculative alternative-perpetrator theory proper exclusion)
- United States v. Wright, 739 F.3d 1160 (8th Cir. 2014) (standard: not necessary to rule out every reasonable hypothesis of innocence)
- United States v. Cook, 356 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2004) (strong emphasis on evaluating evidence in favor of verdict)
- United States v. Surratt, 172 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 1999) (beyond reasonable doubt sufficiency standard)
- United States v. Surratt, 172 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 1999) (evidence need not rule out all innocence theories)