United States v. PATINO
2:22-cr-00031
| D.N.J. | Jun 6, 2025Background
- Kevin Patino, a former Paterson, NJ police officer, pled guilty to two misdemeanor counts of depriving individuals of rights under color of law (excessive force), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, based on assault incidents in 2020 and subsequent filing of false police reports.
- After pleading guilty, Patino obtained new counsel and moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing, alleging ineffective assistance by his prior attorney and claiming he was unaware of key collateral consequences (loss of public employment and pension).
- The government opposed the motion, submitting sworn statements from Patino’s prior counsel (Mr. Spodek) and his co-defendant’s counsel (Mr. Caserta), both disputing Patino’s claims that he was uninformed about collateral consequences.
- The district court considered the motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B), which permits withdrawal of a guilty plea pre-sentencing if the defendant shows a “fair and just reason.”
- The court applied the three-factor Jones test: assertion of innocence, reasons for withdrawal, and prejudice to the government.
Issues
| Issue | Government's Argument | Patino's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Patino adequately assert his innocence? | Patino’s current claims are unsupported and contradicted by prior admissions and lack factual basis. | Patino asserts innocence, stating he pled guilty only on counsel’s advice, not because he was actually guilty. | Patino’s assertion is conclusory and unsupported; weighs against withdrawal. |
| Was Patino’s guilty plea involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel? | Counsel did advise Patino about collateral consequences; counsel’s performance was reasonable and not prejudicial. | Patino claims counsel failed to inform him of the automatic loss of job, pension, and public employment if he pled guilty. | No ineffective assistance; evidence shows Patino was adequately advised; collateral consequences are not required in plea advisement. |
| Did the court or counsel have a duty to inform Patino of collateral consequences? | No constitutional or procedural requirement to advise of collateral (non-penal) consequences. | Patino claims both the court and counsel failed in this duty. | No such duty exists under the law cited. |
| Would permitting withdrawal prejudice the government? | Would be prejudiced by delay, faded memories, trial costs, but only relevant if fair and just reason found. | Patino says withdrawal would not prejudice government due to prompt request and no witness issues. | Not reached; defendant failed on other factors. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (standards for voluntary and intelligent guilty pleas)
- United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670 (1997) (substantial burden to withdraw a guilty plea)
- United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 2003) (three-factor test for plea withdrawal)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (test for ineffective assistance regarding guilty pleas)
- Kincade v. United States, 559 F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1977) (distinguishing direct and collateral consequences of pleas)
- Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (presumption of truthfulness for plea colloquy statements)