United States v. Patillo, 2:02-cr-80810

Defendant Damon Lamar Johnson filed a pro se Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the Court’s August 17, 2017 order that denied his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and denied a certificate of appealability (COA).
Johnson challenged the denial on the ground the Court allegedly misapplied 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), arguing the § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) conviction improperly attached to his aggravated bank robbery count.
The Court had concluded that the bank robbery conviction satisfied the elements clause of § 924(c)(3), making the vagueness challenge to the residual clause irrelevant.
Johnson also argued the district court erred in denying a COA, invoking Buck v. Davis to argue his claims were at least debatable.
The District Court treated Johnson’s filing as a timely Rule 59(e) motion, reviewed the standard for reconsideration (palpable defect/intervening law/new evidence), and found Johnson failed to demonstrate any palpable defect or grounds for relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 59(e) relief is warranted	N/A (government opposed maintaining judgment)	Rule 59(e) should alter the judgment because the § 2255 denial was erroneous	Denied — Johnson did not show a basis (change in law, new evidence, or clear error) for Rule 59(e) relief
Whether the Court misattributed a § 924(c) conviction to the aggravated bank robbery count	Court maintained its original factual/record listing of offenses	Johnson argued the § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) conviction was incorrectly treated as attached to aggravated bank robbery	Denied — Court found no evidence it erred in its listing or attribution
Validity of § 924(c)(3) challenge (elements vs. residual clause)	N/A	Johnson argued the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and affected his § 924(c) conviction	Denied — Court found bank robbery satisfied the elements clause; residual-clause argument was unnecessary and, in any event, Sixth Circuit precedent rejects vagueness challenge
Certificate of appealability (COA) denial	Johnson relied on Buck v. Davis to argue his claims were at least debatable and COA should issue	Court argued Buck requires only a threshold inquiry and that non-debatable claims foreclose COA	Denied — Court found Johnson’s § 924(c)(3) arguments were not debatable and COA was properly denied

Huff v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1982) (district court has discretion over Rule 59(e) motions)
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 1998) (Rule 59(e) not for rehashing previously considered arguments)
FDIC v. World Universal, Inc., 978 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1992) (motions under Rule 59(e) are for reconsideration, not initial consideration)
Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (COA-stage inquiry should be limited to whether the district court’s decision is debatable)
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (standard for certificate of appealability and assessing whether claims are debatable)
Fleck v. Titan Tire Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 605 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (definition and requirement of a "palpable defect" for reconsideration)