United States v. Parthava Nejad
933 F.3d 1162
9th Cir.2019Background
- Nejad was convicted of fraudulently obtaining Social Security, Medicaid, and food-stamp benefits in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 and 1343; indictment sought forfeiture of property constituting or derived from proceeds.
- The proceeds totaled $154,694.50, but Nejad no longer possessed the funds at conviction and the government did not identify specific substitute property before sentencing.
- Instead of seeking specific property, the government requested a Rule 32.2 personal money judgment against Nejad for $154,694.50; the district court entered that judgment over Nejad’s objection.
- Nejad argued that the criminal forfeiture statutes (28 U.S.C. § 2461(c); 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)) authorize only forfeiture of "property," not an in personam money judgment, and that Congress expressly authorized personal money judgments where intended.
- The Ninth Circuit had previously permitted personal money judgments in similar circumstances (United States v. Casey, Newman, Lo), and Nejad urged the court to overrule that precedent in light of Honeycutt v. United States.
- The panel affirmed, concluding Honeycutt did not undermine Ninth Circuit precedent authorizing personal money judgments but clarified enforcement limits under § 853(p).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether criminal forfeiture statutes authorize entry of a personal money judgment when tainted proceeds are unavailable | Gov: Rule 32.2 permits a personal money judgment to represent proceeds, allowing future identification of substitute property | Nejad: Statutes authorize only forfeiture of "property," not in personam money judgments absent explicit congressional authorization | Personal money judgments are permissible; prior Ninth Circuit precedent remains controlling and is not displaced by Honeycutt |
| How personal money judgments may be enforced against untainted substitute assets | Gov: May enforce judgment to collect from defendant’s assets | Nejad: Should be enforced like ordinary civil judgments | Enforcement of personal money judgments is constrained by § 853(p): government must return to court and establish § 853(p) criteria before amending forfeiture to seize substitute property |
Key Cases Cited
- Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017) (addressed limits on joint-and-several forfeiture liability and emphasized statutory procedures for substitute property)
- United States v. Lo, 839 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2016) (approved use of personal money judgments in criminal forfeiture)
- United States v. Newman, 659 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2011) (same)
- United States v. Casey, 444 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (same; relied on § 853(p) to justify money judgments)
- United States v. Valdez, 911 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2018) (held § 853(p) is incorporated by reference in § 2461(c))
- United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2006) (described procedures for converting substitute assets into forfeiture of personal money judgments)
- Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (doctrine governing when a panel may not overrule circuit precedent)
AFFIRMED.