United States v. Parsons
711 F. App'x 1
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- Harry Parsons was originally sentenced to 66 months after the district court, while finding he qualified as a career offender, said it would treat him as if he were not a career offender and based the sentence primarily on § 3553(a) factors.
- While Parsons’ first appeal was pending, Johnson v. United States prompted the government to concede Parsons no longer qualified as a career offender; this Court vacated and remanded for resentencing.
- At resentencing the district court imposed 54 months — eight months above the non-career-offender Guidelines range of 37–46 months — crediting Parsons’ post-conviction conduct but otherwise adopting its prior § 3553(a) analysis.
- Parsons objected, arguing the district court failed to (1) articulate adequate reasons for the upward variance and (2) meaningfully divorce the new sentence from the earlier (now-invalid) career-offender designation; he also argued the variance was substantively unreasonable.
- The district court explained the upward variance by reference to Parsons’ repeated criminal conduct, violations of pretrial release, and the court’s view that Criminal History Category III understated his criminality and likelihood of recidivism.
- The First Circuit affirmed, holding the resentencing was procedurally sound and the 54‑month sentence substantively reasonable given the § 3553(a) considerations and the limited extent of the variance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (United States) | Defendant's Argument (Parsons) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court sufficiently articulated reasons for an upward variance above the GSR | The court relied on § 3553(a) factors and criminal-history concerns to justify variance | The court failed to specify reasons; insufficient explanation for departing from Guidelines | Affirmed: court incorporated prior § 3553(a) analysis and adequately explained reasons for variance |
| Whether resentencing remained tainted by prior (now-invalid) career-offender finding | The government argued vacatur/remand was required earlier; at resentencing government pointed to § 3553(a) reasons independent of career-offender status | Parsons argued the judge did not meaningfully divorce the new sentence from the earlier career-offender determination | Affirmed: judge disavowed reliance on career-offender range and adopted non-career-offender analysis |
| Whether CHC III understated Parsons’ criminal history so as to justify upward variance | Recurrence of offenses and violations of pretrial release supported finding that CHC III underrepresented culpability | Parsons contended recidivism was double-counted because CHC already accounts for criminal history | Affirmed: certain convictions were capped/excluded from CHC and pretrial-release violations were not reflected, so variance was justified |
| Whether the 54‑month upward-variant sentence was substantively reasonable | The sentence is within the range of reasonable outcomes given seriousness, recidivism, and deterrence needs | Parsons argued nothing in his circumstances justified above-range sentence | Affirmed: appellate court gave deference and found a plausible, defensible rationale for the 8‑month variance |
Key Cases Cited
- Martin v. United States, 520 F.3d 87 (1st Cir.) (district court may deviate from Guidelines despite career-offender label)
- Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (courts may vary from Guidelines based on policy disagreements)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (defining limits of career-offender residual clause)
- Ubiles-Rosario v. United States, 867 F.3d 277 (1st Cir.) (bifurcated review of procedural and substantive reasonableness)
- Nieves-Mercado v. United States, 847 F.3d 37 (1st Cir.) (substantive-review standard and deference to district court’s § 3553(a) balancing)
- Del Valle-Rodriguez v. United States, 761 F.3d 171 (1st Cir.) (upward variance justified where CHC underrepresents criminal conduct)
- Politano v. United States, 522 F.3d 69 (1st Cir.) (upholding variance based on underestimated likelihood of recidivism)
- Bermudez-Melendez v. United States, 827 F.3d 160 (1st Cir.) (deference to district court for upward variances)
- Flores-Machicote v. United States, 706 F.3d 16 (1st Cir.) (plausible sentencing rationale: seriousness, history, deterrence)
- Castrillon-Sanchez v. United States, 861 F.3d 26 (1st Cir.) (there is a range of reasonable sentences; context controls review)