United States v. Pantojas-Cruz
800 F.3d 54
| 1st Cir. | 2015Background
- On Aug. 18, 2013, police stopped a vehicle near a murder scene and found Pantojas carrying two .40-caliber pistols (one modified to full auto) and multiple loaded magazines; he admitted the guns were his and that he used marijuana regularly.
- Pantojas was indicted on two counts: (1) being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3), 924(a)(2)) — to which he pleaded guilty — and (2) illegal possession of a machinegun, which was later dismissed at sentencing.
- The plea agreement and PSR calculated a total offense level of 17 and a Guidelines range of 24–30 months (Criminal History Category I); statutory maximum for Count One was 10 years.
- At sentencing the district court considered § 3553(a) factors, noted probable cause had been found in state court linking Pantojas to a murder committed with one of the weapons, and discussed Puerto Rico’s high gun-violence rate and deterrence concerns.
- The district court imposed an upward variance to 60 months’ imprisonment (double the top of the GSR), to be consecutive to any state sentence for the murder if he is convicted; Pantojas appealed arguing procedural and substantive unreasonableness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Pantojas) | Defendant's Argument (Government/District Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court improperly relied on Puerto Rico violent-crime statistics | Court focused too much on community statistics, not on his individual circumstances; abuse of discretion | Court may consider community-based/geographic factors and deterrence; primary basis was probable-cause finding and offense seriousness | Affirmed — no plain error; community factors permissible and did not dominate rationale |
| Whether Rule 32(h) required advance notice of the court’s basis for an above-Guidelines sentence | Failure to include crime-rate reliance in PSR or prehearing filings meant lack of required notice for a departure | Rule 32(h) governs Guideline departures, not § 3553 variances; no surprising ground was used that would trigger advance notice | Affirmed — notice not required for § 3553 variance; grounds were garden-variety and not unfairly surprising |
| Whether the district court provided an adequate explanation for the upward variance | Explanation was insufficient and disproportionate to the degree of variance | Court explained variance was based on probable-cause murder finding, seriousness, deterrence, and defendant’s history | Affirmed — explanation met § 3553(c) requirements and was sufficient for an upward variance |
| Whether the 60-month sentence was substantively unreasonable | Sentence greater than necessary; court should have honored plea-range expectation and given greater weight to mitigating personal history | Court properly weighed § 3553(a) factors, gave permissible weight to offense seriousness and deterrence, and was free to exceed plea expectations | Affirmed — within the wide universe of reasonable sentences; 60 months not greater than necessary |
Key Cases Cited
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (no presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines)
- Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (Rule 32(h) does not apply to § 3553 variances)
- Flores-Machicote v. United States, 706 F.3d 16 (community-based factors and deterrence may inform sentencing)
- Narváez-Soto v. United States, 773 F.3d 282 (community crime prevalence permissible in weighing offense impact)
- Politano v. United States, 522 F.3d 69 (advance notice required only where a variance would unfairly surprise competent counsel)
- Turbides-Leonardo v. United States, 468 F.3d 34 (§ 3553(c) explanation need not be pedantic)
- Del Valle-Rodríguez v. United States, 761 F.3d 171 (two-step review: procedural then substantive reasonableness)