United States v. Palomares, 52 F.4th 640

Background

Nonami Palomares pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute ≥1 kg heroin, an offense carrying a 10-year mandatory minimum; PSR produced a guideline range elevated to 120–121 months because of the mandatory minimum.
Palomares sought safety‑valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), arguing the clause is conjunctive (requires (A) AND (B) AND (C) to disqualify), and thus she was eligible because only (B) applied to her.
The Government argued § 3553(f)(1) is disjunctive in effect: the prefatory negative "does not have" distributes to each subpart, so violating any one of (A)–(C) bars relief.
The district court agreed with the Government, denied safety‑valve relief, granted a 3‑point reduction for acceptance, and sentenced Palomares to 120 months; she appealed.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, adopting the "distributive" reading that the negative prefatory clause applies to each subparagraph so failure of any one provision (here (B)) makes a defendant ineligible; the court rejected lenity and surplusage arguments for the defendant.
Opinions: majority (affirming), Judge Oldham concurring (textualist/contextual reading endorsing distribution), Judge Willett dissenting (arguing plain conjunctive meaning of "and" and would reverse).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proper reading of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1): whether the prefatory negative "does not have —" modifies each subpart (distributive) or applies only collectively (joint/conjunctive)	The Government: "does not have" distributes to each subpart; violating any one of (A),(B),(C) renders defendant ineligible	Palomares: "and" is conjunctive—defendant is ineligible only if all three (A) AND (B) AND (C) apply; here only (B) applies so she is eligible	Court held distributive reading: defendant must not have (A), and must not have (B), and must not have (C); Palomares ineligible because of (B)
Surplusage canon: does reading "and" conjunctively render (A) superfluous?	Govt: distributive reading preserves independent effect of (A) and avoids surplusage issues	Palomares: if (B) and (C) always imply (A), then (A) would be surplusage; alternative arguments on guideline exclusions attempted to save (A)	Court found distributive reading avoids surplusage and makes sense of the clause; rejected defendant's surplusage argument
Use of legislative history vs. statutory text	Govt: text and structure control; legislative history cannot trump unambiguous text	Palomares: legislative history could support disjunctive reading	Court relied on text/structure; declined to rely on legislative history where text supports distribution
Rule of lenity: does any remaining ambiguity require construing statute in favor of defendant?	Govt: statute is interpretable by textual canons; no grievous ambiguity	Palomares: ambiguous drafting favors lenity	Court: after textual/contextual analysis ambiguity is not grievous; lenity does not apply

Key Cases Cited

In re DeBerry, 945 F.3d 943 (5th Cir. 2019) (start with statutory‑textual analysis)
Ramos‑Portillo v. Barr, 919 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 2019) (statutory meaning clarified by broader statutory scheme)
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) (consideration of text and structure in interpretation)
Elgin Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of HHS, 718 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2013) (accounting for punctuation, structure, and subject matter)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (canon against surplusage; give effect to every clause where possible)
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (legislative history cannot defeat unambiguous statutory text)
Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48 (2013) (rule of lenity applies only where grievous ambiguity remains)
United States v. Pulsifer, 39 F.4th 1018 (8th Cir. 2022) (adopted distributive reading—prefatory negative modifies each subpart)
United States v. Lopez, 998 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2021) (rejected distributive reading; exemplifies circuit split)
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76 (1820) (limits on using absurdity doctrine to expand statutory scope)