United States v. Pacheco
ACM S32618
A.F.C.C.A.Sep 30, 2020Background
- Appellant deserted on 4 Feb 2019, was apprehended 6 Feb 2019, and was convicted by plea of desertion at a special court-martial; sentence: bad-conduct discharge, 57 days confinement, reduction to E‑1, and a reprimand.
- Trial ended 2 Apr 2019; convening authority acted 19 Apr 2019; entry of judgment signed 2 Jul 2019; record of trial (ROT) certified 3 Jul 2019.
- Government attempted to mail the ROT three times to addresses provided by Appellant; the ROT was ultimately received by Appellant 13 Sep 2019 and the case was docketed with this court 19 Sep 2019.
- The interval from end of trial to docketing was 170 days, exceeding the Moreno aggregate 150‑day threshold for presumptively unreasonable post‑trial delay.
- Appellant alleged prejudice: inability to obtain employment, particularized anxiety exacerbated by COVID‑19, and requested relief in the form of setting aside his punitive discharge.
- The court found a facially unreasonable delay but, applying Barker factors and Moreno prejudice standards, concluded there was no due process violation and declined to grant Article 66(d) relief; findings and sentence were affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Appellant is entitled to sentence‑appropriateness relief for post‑trial delay (docketing not within Moreno timeframe). | Delay (170 days) denied timely appellate resolution, harmed job prospects, caused anxiety; requests discharge set aside. | Delay resulted largely from Government efforts to serve ROT; Appellant did not timely assert right; no demonstrated prejudice. | Court found facially unreasonable delay but no due process violation under Barker; no prejudice shown; relief denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (establishes post‑trial delay thresholds and Moreno aggregate standard)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (four‑factor balancing test for speedy‑trial/delay claims)
- United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (Article 66(d) authority to grant relief for post‑trial delay)
- United States v. Gay, 74 M.J. 736 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (factors to consider when granting relief for excessive post‑trial delay)
- United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (extreme delay may violate due process by undermining public confidence)
- United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J. 437 (C.A.A.F. 2020) (use of affidavits to resolve post‑trial record disputes)