United States v. Pabon, Jr.
819 F.3d 26
| 1st Cir. | 2016Background
- In 2011 Pabon pled guilty to failing to register under SORNA; the underlying predicate was a 2008 conviction for second-degree child molestation (molesting a 14-year-old).
- At resentencing the district court imposed 30 months' prison and five years' supervised release with special conditions: sex-offender treatment, polygraph testing, no contact/residence/loitering/employment involving minors without probation approval.
- The district court justified the conditions based on Pabon’s substantial criminal history (including the prior sex offense, four assault convictions, a prior SORNA violation) and concerns about public safety and rehabilitation.
- Pabon challenged the conditions as unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and raised, for the first time on appeal, Article III delegation, associational rights (re: his daughter), statutory limits on employment restrictions, and Fifth Amendment concerns about polygraph testing.
- The First Circuit reviewed the § 3583(d) reasonableness claim for abuse of discretion (preserved) and the other claims for plain error (forfeited). The court affirmed the sentence as construed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reasonableness of supervised-release conditions under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) | Conditions are overbroad, not narrowly tailored, unsupported by record | Conditions are reasonably related to deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation given Pabon’s recent sex offense and extensive criminal history | Affirmed — conditions reasonable and adequately explained; not more restrictive than necessary |
| Delegation of authority to probation officer (Article III) | Delegation of power to probation officer to approve contact/residence/work with minors violates Article III | Delegation is typical supervisory authority and permissible | Forfeited; alternatively, no plain error — precedent forecloses the challenge |
| Right to associate with his minor daughter | Court needed a particularized finding that Pabon posed a danger to his own child (Wolf Child standard) | General findings about danger to minors and Pabon’s history suffice; probation-approval safeguard prevents blanket ban | Forfeited; no clear or obvious error — particularized-finding requirement not established in this circuit |
| Polygraph condition and Fifth Amendment | Polygraph testing could force self-incrimination and lead to revocation or prosecution | Condition requires participation in testing but does not compel waiving Fifth Amendment or automatic adverse consequences | Forfeited; construed not to require compelled self-incrimination and no plain error |
| Employment/contact restrictions statutory challenge (18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5) / U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5) | Condition improperly bars broad classes of lawful employment/volunteer activity | Restrictions are subject to prior-approval safety valve and are tailored to protect minors | Forfeited; rejected on precedent and on proper construction |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (plain-error/forfeiture framework)
- United States v. Mercado, 777 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 2015) (upholding sex-offender treatment and associational conditions)
- United States v. Del Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2015) (vacating associational conditions where history sparse and court gave no explanation)
- United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (standards for supervised-release special conditions)
- United States v. Sebastian, 612 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2010) (risk of recidivism for sex offenders)
- McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) (upholding aspects of sex-offender treatment programs)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (plain-error standard)
- United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) (requiring particularized finding in parental-association context)
- United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2005) (associational/employment-condition precedents)
- United States v. Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2013) (sex-offender treatment condition appropriate)