United States v. Otis Sykes
885 F.3d 488
| 7th Cir. | 2018Background
- Joseph Faulkner, a leader of the Imperial Insane Vice Lords (Double I’s), was tried and convicted in a bench trial on: a RICO conspiracy (Count One), a generic drug conspiracy (Count Nine), and two counts related to the Tony Carr shooting (Counts Two and Three). He earlier had pleaded guilty in a separate 2011 prosecution and debriefed to federal agents.
- Faulkner argued the 2013 indictment duplicated conduct addressed in his 2011 case and raised double jeopardy and withdrawal/admissibility defenses; the district judge found him guilty and sentenced him to long terms (aggregate 30 years on Counts One and Nine, plus additional terms).
- Otis Sykes, a non‑member street dealer charged in the same 2013 indictment, was convicted after a bench trial of conspiracy and multiple distribution counts; the district court attributed <100 grams of heroin to him.
- At Sykes’s sentencing the district court considered uncharged conduct (the Andre Brown murder) by a preponderance of the evidence, gave it limited weight, but varied upward from the Guidelines and sentenced Sykes to 195 months.
- On appeal Faulkner challenged (1) sufficiency of the evidence; (2) withdrawal and admissibility of co‑conspirator statements; and (3) double jeopardy. Sykes challenged the substantive reasonableness of his upward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for Faulkner (Counts One, Two, Three) | Faulkner: government relied on his debrief and unreliable witnesses (e.g., Ross); evidence insufficient to prove conspiracy and that he ordered the shooting | Government: debrief corroborated by seized narcotics, witness testimony, and intercepted calls; Ross’s testimony and other evidence support convictions | Affirmed — viewing evidence in government’s favor, a rational factfinder could convict; Ross’s testimony not incredible as a matter of law |
| Withdrawal from conspiracy and admissibility of co‑conspirator statements | Faulkner: his 2011 debrief withdrew him; post‑arrest wiretap statements were inadmissible hearsay if he had withdrawn or if statements not in furtherance | Government: withdrawal irrelevant because convictions were supported by pre‑arrest conduct; co‑conspirator evidence cumulative and not prejudicial | Affirmed — withdrawal was irrelevant to guilt and double jeopardy here; any error admitting calls was not shown to be prejudicial |
| Double jeopardy (successive prosecutions) | Faulkner: second prosecution prosecuted same conduct as 2011 case; overlapping evidence shows duplicative punishment | Government: prior panel already rejected double jeopardy; different elements (conspiracy vs. substantive offenses) pass Blockburger; Witte controls use of conduct at sentencing | Affirmed — law‑of‑the‑case (Faulkner I) controls; Blockburger analysis shows distinct offenses; no clear error shown |
| Reasonableness of Sykes’s above‑Guidelines sentence | Sykes: court over‑relied on criminal history, improperly considered uncharged murder evidence, and failed to address sentencing disparity with similarly situated co‑defendants | Government: court properly weighed long criminal history, considered Brown murder by preponderance (but gave it limited weight), and Sykes failed to present adequate disparity proof | Affirmed — no procedural error; upward variance (18%) adequately explained and substantively reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Faulkner, 793 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2015) (prior interlocutory appeal resolving double jeopardy and related issues)
- Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995) (using same conduct at sentencing and prosecution does not constitute double punishment)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (test for whether successive prosecutions charge the same offense)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (procedural and substantive standards for appellate review of sentencing)
- United States v. Nagelvoort, 856 F.3d 1117 (7th Cir. 2017) (withdrawal and co‑conspirator statement principles)
- United States v. Garcia, 754 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2014) (RICO conspiracy requires knowledge and agreement to facilitate predicate scheme)