United States v. Osborne Henriques
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22333
| 8th Cir. | 2012Background
- Henriques was indicted for drug possession and found incompetent to stand trial, leading the district court to commit him to the Attorney General under §4241(d) to determine restorability.
- A defense psychiatrist and a government-ordered evaluation produced conflicting opinions on Henriques’ competency, with the BOP initially concluding competency after 60 days.
- At the competency hearing, the court found him incompetent and, instead of immediately committing for restoration, scheduled a second hearing to assess restoration options.
- The second hearing concluded Henriques could never be restored, and the court committed him to the Attorney General for treatment to determine restoration probability.
- Henriques contends the commitment under §4241(d) is unconstitutional under Jackson v. Indiana because further commitment serves no purpose.
- The court affirms the district court, applying de novo review to the statute and concluding the commitment is proper for restoration evaluation and within four months.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §4241(d) commitment for restoration evaluation complies with due process under Jackson. | Henriques argues commitment serves no purpose. | Henriques argues misapplication; however, district court properly used §4241(d) to evaluate restorability. | Yes; commitment for restoration evaluation does not violate due process. |
| Whether the second hearing prematurely determined restorability. | Second hearing prematurely declared non-restorability. | Second hearing properly addressed restorability within §4241(d); 4246 procedures were not applicable yet. | Premature determination was not fatal; commitment under §4241(d) was proper. |
| Whether the district court's overall commitment under §4241(d) was proper given prior findings. | Prior restorability finding and prior BOP competency conclusion undermine further commitment. | Millard-Grasshorn and Ferro require commitment to determine restorability regardless of earlier findings. | Commitment under §4241(d) for restoration evaluation was proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Ferro, 321 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2003) (review of collateral-order-like questions; restoration evaluation under §4241(d))
- Millard-Grasshorn v. United States, 603 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 2010) (requires §4241(d) commitment for restoration evaluation even if restorability appears unlikely)
- Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (S. Ct. 1972) (due process limits on commitment for incapacity to stand trial; reasonable period for restoration)
- United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1994) (four-year confinement to determine restorability not per se permissible; contrast for shorter periods)