United States v. Ortiz-Vega
860 F.3d 20
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- Ortiz was charged in a multi-defendant drug and firearm conspiracy in Puerto Rico and initially represented by court-appointed counsel Francisco Dolz; he later retained private counsel Luis Rivera.
- Dolz and Ortiz dispute the extent and timing of communications during plea negotiations; Ortiz alleges Dolz failed to inform him adequately about plea offers and rejections.
- The government initially offered a plea with a Guidelines range of 130–147 months; Ortiz ultimately signed a later plea negotiated by Rivera with an agreed Guidelines range of 168–180 months and pled guilty on August 6, 2012.
- Before sentencing Ortiz repeatedly asserted (pro se and via Rivera) that Dolz s ineffective assistance during plea negotiations cost him a better deal; the district court found the claim "premature" and declined to decide it prior to sentencing.
- The district court sentenced Ortiz to 174 months; on appeal the First Circuit held the district court abused its discretion by not resolving the pre-judgment ineffective-assistance claim and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Ortiz's Argument | Government / Dolz Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability of the plea waiver | Waiver should not bar appeal because plea negotiations were tainted by ineffective assistance (would work a miscarriage of justice) | Waiver is enforceable; Ortiz can raise claim in a §2255 collateral attack so no miscarriage of justice | Court exercised discretion not to enforce waiver because alleged Sixth Amendment error could render enforcement a miscarriage of justice |
| Whether district court must decide ineffective-assistance claim before sentencing | Court should adjudicate pre-judgment ineffective-assistance claims when first raised and record permits, especially where prior counsel no longer represents defendant | Court may defer to post-conviction §2255 process; premature to decide before judgment | District court abused its discretion by declining to rule pre-sentencing given developed record and Dolz had been relieved; remand for adjudication |
| Standard for assessing counsel performance in plea negotiations | Apply Strickland: deficient performance + prejudice (reasonable probability result would differ) | Agrees Strickland applies; factual development needed to show prejudice | First Circuit followed Strickland framework and noted district court was positioned to take evidence and decide prejudgment |
| Appropriateness of remand vs. direct-resolution on appeal | Ortiz urged merits be decided now or remanded for hearing so he need not rely solely on §2255 | Government preferred §2255 route; argued no prejudice from waiting | Court remanded to district court for proceedings to resolve ineffective-assistance claim (retained jurisdiction over other claims) |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two-part ineffective assistance test: performance and prejudice)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133 (2012) (recognizes importance and fluidity of plea-bargaining process and counsel's role)
- United States v. Brown, 623 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2010) (district court may and sometimes should resolve pre-judgment ineffective-assistance claims)
- United States v. Steele, 733 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2013) (adopts Brown rule; permits district courts to consider such claims pre-judgment)
- United States v. Colón-Torres, 382 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2004) (options when ineffective-assistance claims appear on direct appeal; remand without forcing §2255 when record shows indicia of ineffectiveness)
- United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (describes miscarriage-of-justice exception to enforceability of appeal waivers)
- United States v. Prochilo, 187 F.3d 221 (1st Cir. 1999) (trial court must inquire into timely objections to counsel; failure to inquire can be an abuse of discretion)