711 F.3d 316
2d Cir.2013Background
- Defendant Michael Sessa was convicted in 1992 of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, murder conspiracy, murder, extortionate credit schemes, and firearms offenses in connection with the Colombo Family.
- Evidence at trial included agent DeVecchio’s background testimony and Ambrosino’s eyewitness account of Coluccio’s murder, aided by a gun found later in a storm drain.
- After conviction, new information emerged showing DeVecchio’s misconduct with Scarpa, an FBI informant, and Scarpa’s extensive criminal history.
- Post-trial, NYPD reports revealed potential discrepancies related to Coluccio’s murder timeline and witness accounts, and fingerprint results that yielded no match.
- Sessa moved for a new trial under Rule 33, arguing Brady violations, suppression of exculpatory evidence, and perjured trial testimony.
- The district court denied the Rule 33 motion; the Second Circuit reviews for abuse of discretion and independently assesses materiality of suppressed evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NYPD reports were exculpatory Brady material | Sessa argues reports were exculpatory and suppressed. | The government contends the reports were not material or exculpatory. | Not material; Brady not violated. |
| Whether DeVecchio–Scarpa relationship disclosure was Brady material | Sessa contends disclosure of Scarpa’s informant status was Brady material. | Disclosing Scarpa’s status would not have changed the result. | Not material; no Brady violation. |
| Whether DeVecchio testified falsely and whether prosecutors knew or should have known | Perjury by DeVecchio and prosecutorial knowledge were required to disclose under Agurs. | DeVecchio’s testimony was immaterial to guilt; prosecutors could not have known. | Testimony immaterial; no due process violation. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2008) (abuse of discretion standard for Rule 33 motions)
- United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200 (2d Cir. 1995) (materiality standard for suppressed evidence)
- United States v. Imran, 964 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1992) (factual findings reviewed for clear error)
- United States v. Wong, 78 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1996) (perjury evidence not necessarily requiring new trial)
- Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1976) (due process limits on false or withheld testimony)
- United States v. Reyes, 49 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1995) (perjury with marginal significance does not require new trial)
- Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (U.S. 1972) (no constitutional requirement for exhaustive prosecution accounting)
- Jackson, 345 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2003) (reasonable doubt about materiality of witness testimony)