United States v. Olson
2015 CAAF LEXIS 326
| C.A.A.F. | 2015Background
- Appellant (Air Force enlisted) was interviewed by AFOSI after her husband’s arrest on drug distribution suspicions; she went to AFOSI HQ voluntarily and was not physically restrained.
- During the interview agents held her cell phone and she initially resisted but later signed a written consent to search her off‑base residence at ~1:00 p.m. on August 17.
- She drove to her residence while AFOSI agents followed; agents and local police searched the house from ~2:00 p.m. to 12:40 a.m.; later she gave consent to search her vehicle and admitted knowledge of paraphernalia.
- Appellant later moved to suppress evidence from the residential search and derivative statements, arguing her consent was involuntary because she was effectively a suspect and was not informed of Article 31(b) rights before consenting.
- The military judge found consent voluntary after applying the Wallace six‑factor framework; the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed and the CAAF granted review and affirmed that ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Olson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether consent to search home was voluntary | Consent involuntary because she was effectively a suspect, not told Article 31(b), and pressured while in AFOSI control | Consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances and Wallace factors: no threats, no restraint, she understood right to refuse and signed form | Consent was voluntary; suppression denial affirmed |
| Whether failure to advise Article 31(b) rendered consent coercive | Non‑advisement created coercive effect and impacted consultation with counsel | Although she should have been advised, the omission did not produce coercive effect under the totality of circumstances | Failure to give Article 31(b) warnings did not make consent involuntary |
| Whether military judge abused discretion admitting derivative evidence | Admission improper because primary consent tainted fruits | Evidence admissible because primary consent found voluntary by military judge | No abuse of discretion; admission upheld |
| Standard and burden for proving voluntary consent | N/A (challenger bears the issue) | Prosecution must prove voluntariness by clear and convincing evidence | Military judge’s findings not clearly erroneous; clear‑and‑convincing standard met |
Key Cases Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (voluntariness of consent measured by totality of the circumstances)
- United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (consent must be essentially free and unconstrained)
- United States v. Wallace, 66 M.J. 5 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (six nonexclusive factors to analyze voluntariness of consent)
- United States v. Kitts, 43 M.J. 23 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (will not overturn military judge’s voluntary‑consent finding unless clearly erroneous)