United States v. Oliver King
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23091
| 9th Cir. | 2013Background
- Oliver King (aka Hamid Malekpour), an Iranian-born Canadian, helped form McMinnville Hunting and Police Supply (MHPS) and assisted U.S. citizen Amir Zarandi in obtaining an FFL; King was ineligible for an FFL himself.
- King handled MHPS paperwork, used Reznick’s card to fund incorporation/lease, and communicated with ATF about the license while representing himself as a consultant.
- After the license issued, King covertly used MHPS’s accounts and forged Zarandi’s signature to order numerous firearms, magazines, and ammunition from dealers, and transported firearms to a U-Haul storage unit.
- King lied repeatedly to CBP/ICE about his travel purposes when entering the U.S.; agents later seized 21 firearms and incriminating documents (forged applications, copies of Zarandi’s documents, MHPS records) from his car and storage unit.
- Indicted on unlawful dealing in firearms (18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A)), unlawful possession/transportation by an alien (later vacated), and three § 1001 false-statement counts; convicted on all counts at trial; sentence later remanded and reimposed on remaining counts.
Issues
| Issue | King’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether King was entitled to jury instruction that government must prove he was not acting as an authorized agent of a licensed dealer for § 922(a)(1)(A) | King argued he acted as an authorized agent of MHPS (a licensee), so he could not be an unlicensed dealer | Statute’s plain text treats an individual as a “person”; allowing an agent defense would subvert the licensing scheme and permit a sham-corporation workaround | Instruction properly refused; an agent cannot claim principal’s license to avoid § 922 liability |
| Sufficiency of evidence that King “engaged in the business” of dealing firearms | King argued evidence was insufficient to show he engaged in business rather than hobby/consulting | Government pointed to incorporation, repeated orders, use of company accounts, transport/storage, attempted sales, and sales of ammo/mags | Evidence was sufficient; no plain error — a rational jury could find business activity and intent to profit |
| Materiality of King’s false statements to CBP under § 1001 | King claimed lies were immaterial because agents would have admitted him anyway (investigation existed) | Government showed officers testified they might have denied admission had they known his true purpose; materiality requires propensity to influence | Materiality supported — misstatements had a natural tendency to influence admission decisions |
| Whether OLC opinion (vacating alien-possession theory) warranted a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 | King argued the OLC opinion was newly discovered evidence undermining trial fairness | Government: change in law/opinion is not newly discovered evidence; opinion unrelated to other convictions | Denial of new trial affirmed; change in law/opinion is not newly discovered evidence and not material to remaining counts |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Fleischli, 305 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2002) (an agent cannot escape criminal liability by hiding behind a licensed corporate principal)
- United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (U.S. 1995) (materiality is a jury question)
- United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- United States v. Selby, 557 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2009) (materiality as an element of § 1001)
- United States v. Marguet-Pillado, 648 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2011) (defendant’s right to jury instruction on theory of the case)
- United States v. O’Donnell, 608 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (start with statutory text in instruction analysis)
- Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814 (U.S. 1974) (Gun Control Act’s purpose to restrict public access to firearms)
- Jonah R. v. Carmona, 446 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2006) (considering statute’s overall purpose in interpretation)
- Casanova Guns, Inc. v. Connally, 454 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1972) (disregard corporate fiction used to circumvent statute)
- United States v. Breier, 813 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1987) (defining factors for ‘‘engaged in the business’’ under § 921(a)(21)(C))