517 F.Supp.3d 444
D. Maryland2021Background
- Defendant Seun Banjo Ojedokun was convicted by a jury of one count of money‑laundering conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).
- Original indictment (May 6, 2018) alleged the predicate/“specified unlawful activity” as conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349); superseding indictment (Aug. 10, 2020) amended that to wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343).
- The charged conduct ended in March 2015; the superseding indictment was returned more than five years later, prompting a statute of limitations challenge.
- Defense argued the original indictment was legally deficient (predicate mis‑pleaded), so the superseding indictment could not "relate back" and toll the statute of limitations; later counsel also argued lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction under the presumption against extraterritoriality (defendant lived in Nigeria during the conduct).
- The court concluded the mis‑citation of the predicate was not an omission of an essential element, the superseding indictment did not broaden or substantially amend the original charge, and relation back was proper; Rule 7(c)(2) prejudice argument also rejected.
- On extraterritoriality, the court held § 1956(f) unambiguously authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction where, inter alia, conduct "occurs in part in the United States," and the co‑conspirator’s U.S. conduct (Maryland) satisfied that test; lenity and vagueness claims were denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the superseding indictment relates back to toll the statute of limitations when the original mis‑identified the specified unlawful activity | Original indictment was timely and adequate; mis‑citation was a non‑fatal citation error; relation back allowed if superseding does not broaden charge | Original was invalid because it named conspiracy to commit wire fraud (§1349) — not a §1956 “specified unlawful activity” — so superseding (filed after limitations) cannot relate back | Court: Specified unlawful activity is not an essential element; mis‑citation was trivial; superseding indictment relates back; statute‑of‑limitations defense denied |
| Whether the citation error prejudiced defendant under Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(2) | Govt: No prejudice; original gave adequate notice of the money‑laundering conspiracy | Defendant: He was misled and would have used the error as a defense at trial | Court: No prejudice or confusion; Rule 7(c)(2) inapplicable to warrant dismissal |
| Whether the court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction because defendant’s conduct occurred entirely abroad | Govt: §1956(f) plainly authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction where conduct occurs in part in U.S.; co‑conspirator acted in Maryland; $10,000 threshold satisfied | Defendant: As a non‑U.S. citizen who acted in Nigeria, presumption against extraterritoriality bars prosecution; no jurisdiction | Court: §1956(f) overcomes presumption; co‑conspirator U.S. conduct supplies the required nexus; jurisdiction exists |
| Whether rule of lenity or void‑for‑vagueness require dismissal or narrower reading of §1956(f) | Govt: Statute is clear and unambiguous; lenity and vagueness inapplicable | Defendant: If extraterritorial reach ambiguous, apply lenity; §1956(f) is vague | Court: Statute is unambiguous; neither lenity nor void‑for‑vagueness applies |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir. 1995) (indictment must allege essential facts and elements; specifying a statutory predicate can suffice without detailing all underlying facts)
- United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2008) (elements of §1956(h) money‑laundering conspiracy defined)
- United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2010) (reaffirming elements required to prove §1956(h) conspiracy)
- United States v. Snowden, 770 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1985) ("relation back" doctrine: trivial or innocuous changes to an indictment do not bar tolling of limitations)
- United States v. Ratcliff, 245 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2001) (notice to defendant is the touchstone for relation‑back analysis)
- RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (two‑step framework for presumption against extraterritoriality)
- Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960) (charging different substantive conduct than indicted can constitute impermissible broadening of an indictment)