United States v. Odis Jackson, 945 F.3d 315

Jackson was convicted in 2003 of possession with intent to distribute ≥50 grams of crack and a related conspiracy count; jury instructions required only that the offense involve ≥50 grams.
Due to multiple prior felony drug convictions and an §851 enhancement, the district court imposed a mandatory life sentence plus supervised release.
The Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) of 2010 raised crack thresholds (50→280 grams; 5→28 grams) but was not initially retroactive; the First Step Act (FSA §404) later authorized discretionary resentencing as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect.
Jackson moved under §404 for resentencing; the district court denied relief, later explaining it exercised discretion because (1) life remained within the statutory range after applying the Fair Sentencing Act given his priors, (2) Jackson had a central role in the offense, and (3) his extensive criminal history.
On appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed: it held the abuse-of-discretion standard generally governs FSA resentencing decisions, that a “covered offense” depends on the statute of conviction (not later PSR drug-quantity findings), and that the district court did not err procedurally in declining to resentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standard of review for FSA §404 resentencing decisions	Jackson: implied that court must conduct full merits review; error if not	Gov: district court has discretion; denial reviewed for abuse of discretion	Abuse of discretion governs generally; statutory questions reviewed de novo
Meaning of “covered offense” under §404(a)	Jackson: offense covered because convicted under statute whose penalties were amended	Gov (earlier positions): eligibility should depend on actual drug quantity (PSR), not just statute	“Covered offense” depends on the statute of conviction, not post-trial factual findings
Required procedures for §404 motions (hearing, new PSR, consider post-sentencing conduct)	Jackson: court needed hearing, updated PSR, and to consider post-sentencing conduct	Gov: statute imposes no such procedural requirements; district court may act without a hearing	No procedural mandate in §404; district court need not hold a hearing or consider post-sentencing conduct (though may do so)
Whether denial was an abuse of discretion on these facts	Jackson: role was minor and prior convictions involved small quantities, so resentencing warranted	Gov: life sentence still within statutory range; Jackson’s role and criminal history support denial	No abuse of discretion: life remained a permissible sentence; court permissibly relied on role and criminal history

United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019) (FSA resentencing does not contemplate plenary resentencing; court acts within original sentencing timeframe)
United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2019) (statutory-interpretation support for reading “covered offense” to refer to statute)
United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2009) (decision to reduce sentence under §3582(c)(2) reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (modifier-attaches-to-closest-noun principle)
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999) (statutory construction begins with the statute’s text)
Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998) (avoid superfluous statutory readings)
United States v. Larry, 632 F.3d 933 (5th Cir. 2011) (procedural fairness required when court acts sua sponte)
Century Surety Co. v. Blevins, 799 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2015) (criticized sua sponte dismissals without notice)
Diece-Lisa Indus., Inc. v. Disney Enters., Inc., 943 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2019) (faulted court for vacating orders sua sponte without opportunity to respond)