United States v. Oakie, 3:16-cr-30066

Defendant Lawrence Oakie was acquitted by a jury on May 5, 2017, of aggravated sexual abuse of a child.
Oakie’s counsel filed a motion seeking permission to contact jurors after the trial to ask about their thoughts and opinions of the trial.
District of South Dakota Local Rule 47.2 requires court permission before contacting jurors after service.
Federal courts generally disfavor post‑verdict juror interviews to protect juror privacy, deliberative freedom, and verdict finality.
Courts typically permit post‑verdict juror contact only after a preliminary showing of external intrusion, prejudicial outside influence, or juror misconduct.
Oakie made no allegation of external interference or juror misconduct; his stated purpose was to obtain jurors’ opinions, not to investigate improper influence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether court should allow post‑verdict contact with jurors	Oakie seeks to question jurors about their thoughts/opinions of the trial	Court must protect juror privacy and deliberative freedom; contact disfavored absent external intrusion	Denied as a matter of discretion absent a showing of outside intrusion; limited contact may be allowed if court approves questions first
Whether preliminary showing of outside influence is required before juror interviews	Oakie did not allege outside influence	Court and precedent require a threshold showing of external intrusion or prejudicial influence	Court follows precedent requiring such a showing and finds none here
Scope/conditions for any permitted juror contact	Oakie requests open contact with jurors	Court conditions any contact on submission and approval of proposed questions and on noncoercive, voluntary contact	Court orders Oakie to file the questions; approved questions only; jurors may decline to speak
Weight of First Amendment/attorney curiosity in permitting interviews	Oakie’s interest in information for advocacy	First Amendment curiosity is limited and outweighed by juror privacy and orderly administration of justice	Court rejects curiosity as sufficient ground to permit interviews absent misconduct

United States v. Booker, 334 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2003) (trial court has discretion to deny post‑trial juror interviews absent illegal or prejudicial intrusion)
United States v. Wright, 506 F.3d 1293 (10th Cir. 2007) (denial of juror inquiry proper where no claim of external interference)
United States v. Self, 681 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2012) (federal courts generally disfavor post‑verdict juror interviews)
McElroy v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 894 F.2d 1504 (11th Cir. 1990) (denial of post‑verdict juror interviews not abuse where no allegation of outside influence)
Pall v. Coffin, 970 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1992) (protecting jurors from harassment and preserving deliberative freedom justify limitation on post‑verdict contact)
Wilkerson v. Amco Corp., 703 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1983) (court interest in verdict certainty supports disfavoring juror interviews)
Haeherle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984) (litigant curiosity and advocacy interests are limited compared to juror privacy)
McDougal v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (declining post‑trial juror interviews absent evidence of juror impropriety)
United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1976) (defendant has no right to subpoena jurors without specific allegations of improper acts)