753 F. Supp. 2d 492
E.D. Pa.2010Background
- Defendant Ian Norris, a UK national, faced U.S. extradition and was charged in a second superseding indictment with Counts Two–Four; Counts Three and Four were based on obstruction-related statutes, Count Two charged conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to violate §1512(b)(1) or (b)(2)(B).
- Extradition barred prosecution under the Sherman Act, so Norris was tried only on Counts Two–Four; after trial, he was convicted on Count Two but acquitted on Counts Three and Four.
- The conspiracy alleged Norris and co-conspirators created false meeting scripts to mislead grand jury and Antitrust Division questioning regarding Morgan’s price-fixing meetings with Carbone, Schunk, and Hoffman.
- Document destruction efforts and retirement of a Morgan pricing officer (Emerson) were argued as acts to impede the grand jury’s investigation and to influence testimony.
- Nine Antitrust Division witnesses testified; Norris presented one defense witness; the jury form allowed conviction for conspiracy to attempt to influence testimony or to cause destruction of records.
- The court denied Norris’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal and Rule 33 motion for a new trial, concluding there was sufficient evidence, the charge was legally adequate, and trial errors did not require relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to obstruct justice | Norris conspired to obstruct grand jury testimony or to impair records. | Acquittals on the substantive counts undermine conspiracy evidence; evidence fails to show agreement or intent. | Yes; substantial evidence showed agreement and intent to obstruct/grand jury testimony. |
| Did the evidence establish conspiracy to violate §1512(b)(1) or §1512(b)(2)(B) | Scripts and actions after subpoena show intent to influence testimony and conceal records for grand jury use. | Evidence merely shows misstatements to defense or attorneys, not grand jury influence; nexus uncertain. | Yes; rational jury could find conspiracy to violate either §1512(b)(1) or §1512(b)(2)(B). |
| Is conspiracy-to-attempt a valid charging theory under the indictment | Conspiracy to attempt to commit §1512(b) offenses is permissible when paired with substantive attempts. | Conspiracy-to-attempt is improper or unconstitutional in this context. | Permissible; based on Meacham and related authority, conspiracy-to-attempt is valid here. |
| Were there errors in jury instructions that justify a new trial | Instructions properly defined nexus and overt acts; any errors were harmless or invited response. | Several asserted defects could prejudice defendant and warrant a new trial. | No; claims either lacked plain error or were harmless in light of the whole record. |
| Did alleged prosecutorial missteps and discovery issues merit a new trial | Closing arguments were within proper bounds; discovery issues did not prejudice Norris; no Brady/Rule 16 failure. | Prosecutor referenced outside-the-record facts and personal attacks; discovery and privilege issues tainted trial. | No; alleged missteps did not rise to plain error or deprive Norris of a fair trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (Supreme Court, 1984) (inconsistent verdicts do not require reversal)
- United States v. Vastine, 363 F.2d 853 (3d Cir., 1966) (conspiracy upheld despite acquittal on substantive offenses)
- Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (Supreme Court, 1991) (general verdict on multi-object conspiracy may stand if at least one object proven)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (Supreme Court, 2005) (nexus between obstructive act and proceeding required for §1512(b))
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (Supreme Court, 1995) (nexus to official proceedings not necessarily require certainty of impact)
- United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503 (5th Cir., 1980) (conspiracy-to-attempt prosecutions permitted where underlying acts criminal)