United States v. Nikolay Tantchev, 916 F.3d 645

Background

Defendants: Nikolay Tantchev (Chicago trucking/warehouse owner) and Batmagnai Chogsom (employee). Jury convicted Tantchev on counts of exporting/attempting to export stolen vehicles, submitting false CBP documents, and structuring bank deposits; convicted Chogsom only for making a false statement to an IRS agent; both appealed.
CBP discovered multiple containers shipped from Tantchev’s warehouse to Mongolia/Bulgaria contained stolen vehicles while paperwork declared different contents.
Tantchev ran a side shipping business ordering discounted containers, having customers load them, and forwarding manifests to Atlantic Express/CBP; he disputed knowledge of thefts.
From March–May 2011 Tantchev deposited ~$574,965 into multiple bank accounts in amounts under $10,000, then transfers totaling ~$552,090 were wired to accounts in Sofia; Fifth Third Bank reported suspected structuring.
IRS agent interviewed Chogsom, showed a photo from an Illinois ID in the name "Jianmei Li" (actually an alias held by Chogsom’s sister Burmaa). Chogsom identified the photo as "Jianmei Li," later admitting he intended to protect his sister.

Issues

Issue	Government's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Chogsom’s identification of the photo as “Jianmei Li” was a false statement under 18 U.S.C. §1001	The answer was knowingly false because agents sought the woman’s true identity; giving an alias to shield his sister was materially false	Chogsom: Statement literally true because the woman used the name "Jianmei Li" in the U.S.; Bronston-type defense — literally true answers not criminal	Affirmed: Jury could reasonably find Chogsom understood agents wanted her true identity and knowingly gave a false name (distinguishing Bronston; akin to Gorman)
Whether district court erred by giving a deliberate-avoidance ("ostrich") instruction to the jury as to Tantchev’s knowledge	Evidence (failure to inspect containers, change in practice, red flags) supported willful blindness inference	Tantchev: Evidence does not show deliberate avoidance; at most negligence or actual knowledge — instruction inappropriate when only binary choice exists	Affirmed: Given close evidence and deference to district court, instruction was not an abuse of discretion; jury could infer deliberate avoidance
Whether instruction that possession of recently stolen property permits an inference of knowledge was supported	Possession of stolen vehicles permits jury to infer knowledge; whether possession was recent and circumstances are factual questions for jury	Tantchev: He had a legitimate role as shipper and customers loaded cars; cars were not stolen in a conventional way	Affirmed: Instruction proper; factual disputes about possession/timing were for the jury
Whether prosecutor’s cross-exam and closing comments (impeachment with other seizures; misstating that supervisors were fired for malfeasance) required a new trial	Cross-exam was proper impeachment; closing remark was an improper factual reference but harmless given curative instruction and strong evidence	Tantchev: Cross-exam mischaracterized direct testimony; closing comment introduced facts not in evidence and prejudiced jury	Affirmed: Court did not abuse discretion in permitting impeachment; prosecutor’s misstatement was improper but cured and not prejudicial in light of the evidence

Key Cases Cited

Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (literally true, non-responsive answers cannot support perjury conviction)
United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010) (jury may infer how defendant understood ambiguous question; false answer upheld)
United States v. Rahman, 805 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying Bronston/Gorman reasoning in §1001 context)
United States v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2006) (framework for deliberate-avoidance evidence and ostrich instruction)
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (willful blindness standard requires more than recklessness)