United States v. Nikita Griffin
854 F.3d 911
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Griffin pleaded guilty to conspiring to submit false income tax returns and cashing fraudulent refund checks; plea agreement capped statutory exposure and contained an appellate-waiver clause.
- Plea agreement stipulated a total offense level of 10 "before Acceptance of Responsibility" and the government promised to recommend a two-level acceptance reduction if Griffin’s conduct continued to reflect acceptance, but left final acceptance determination to the court.
- At initial sentencing the district court denied acceptance and applied a two-level obstruction enhancement, producing a 10–16 month Guideline range and a 12-month sentence; this was vacated and remanded for inadequate factual findings.
- At resentencing testimony showed Griffin earlier minimized his role (denying he provided taxpayer information) and later admissions and investigative developments implicated him in supplying personal information to the accountant.
- The district court again applied the §3C1.1 obstruction enhancement, denied the §3E1.1 acceptance reduction, calculated a 10–16 month range, and imposed a 10-month sentence.
- Griffin appealed the resentencing, challenging the obstruction enhancement and denial of acceptance; the government moved to dismiss based on Griffin’s appellate waiver.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Griffin’s appellate waiver bars his challenge to sentence | Government: waiver is valid and bars challenges to sentence that do not exceed the stipulated Guideline maximum | Griffin: waiver does not bar because the agreed-upon Guideline range should reflect the government’s promised acceptance recommendation (level 8, 0–6 months), and his 10‑month sentence exceeds that range | Waiver bars appeal; sentence (10 months) did not exceed the maximum of the range determined under the plea stipulations and computations (level 10, CHC I => 6–12 months) |
| Whether the plea agreement’s stipulation of level 10 foreclosed appeal when court used level 12 | Government: plea stipulation controls the stipulated computations for waiver scope | Griffin: acceptance recommendation effectively lowered the stipulated range to level 8 | Court: waiver applies even though court used a higher offense level; waiver scope measured by stipulated computations, not defendant’s preferred computation |
| Whether the acceptance-of-responsibility issue is preserved for appeal despite waiver | Griffin: government’s promise to recommend acceptance created an enforceable stipulation for waiver calculations | Government: recommendation was conditional and left final determination to court; thus not a stipulation for waiver-scope purposes | Court: acceptance recommendation did not create a binding stipulated computation; waiver covers sentencing challenges not exceeding stipulated maximum |
| Whether obstruction enhancement and denial of acceptance could be reviewed notwithstanding waiver | Griffin: factual error in applying §3C1.1 and §3E1.1 should permit review | Government: claim falls within waiver scope and is waived | Court: appeal dismissed under waiver; substantive challenges not addressed on merits |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2001) (valid, knowing, voluntary appellate waivers preclude appellate review)
- United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2012) (scope-of-waiver analysis is reviewed de novo)
- United States v. English, [citation="520 F. App'x 428"] (6th Cir. 2013) (a government recommendation to recommend acceptance does not convert into a stipulated sentencing computation for waiver purposes)
- United States v. Moorer, [citation="667 F. App'x 540"] (6th Cir. 2016) (appeal waiver bars review where sentence did not exceed the maximum under the plea’s stipulated computations)