United States v. Nieves-Mercado
847 F.3d 37
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- On March 15, 2013, Nieves and two codefendants carjacked a red Ford Explorer; Nieves physically removed the driver and drove off in the vehicle.
- The vehicle was later found being disassembled for parts; two codefendants were caught removing parts and one admitted the plan to sell parts to satisfy a debt allegedly owed by Nieves.
- Nieves pleaded guilty to carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 pursuant to a plea agreement that included a Guidelines calculation yielding offense level 22 and a government promise to recommend a sentence in the middle of the applicable Guidelines range.
- The PSR mirrored the plea calculation, placed Nieves in Criminal History Category I (CHC I), and recounted the codefendant’s out-of-court inculpatory statement to FBI agents about selling parts to pay Nieves’s debt.
- At sentencing the district court adopted the Guidelines calculation (41–51 months) but imposed an upward variance to 60 months, citing factors including Nieves’s juvenile delinquency history, the particular nature of his criminal history and conduct, and the emotional harm to the victim.
- On appeal Nieves argued the district court erred by (1) relying on unreliable hearsay from a codefendant, (2) double-counting factors already accounted for in the Guidelines, and (3) discounting his youth as a mitigating factor, rendering the sentence procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Nieves) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| District court reliance on codefendant’s out-of-court statement at sentencing | The court may consider reliable hearsay in sentencing; the PSR disclosed the statement and it bore indicia of reliability | The statement was unreliable hearsay and the court improperly relied on it without explicit findings | The court did not abuse discretion: the statement had indicia of reliability (near-contemporaneous, inculpatory, consistent with observed conduct) and was properly considered |
| Whether variance double-counted factors already in the Guidelines | The court identified aspects of Nieves’s criminal history and victim harm that meaningfully distinguished this case from the ordinary Guidelines case | The court relied on factors already reflected in the Guidelines, so the upward variance was unjustified | The court appropriately relied on particulars (juvenile delinquency pattern, seriousness of victim’s harm) that the Guidelines did not adequately account for; no double-counting error |
| Weight given to youth as mitigation | The government acknowledged youth but argued the court permissibly balanced it against other factors | Nieves argued district court ignored or insufficiently weighed neuroscience and youth-related mitigation | The court considered Nieves’s age and juvenile record but weighed them less heavily given evidence of disregard for others; that balancing was within sentencing discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Pantojas-Cruz, 800 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2015) (standard for reviewing reasonableness of Guidelines sentences)
- United States v. Rivera-González, 776 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2015) (district court discretion in weighing mitigating factors like youth)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (procedural and substantive reasonableness review framework for sentences)
- United States v. Del Valle-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d 171 (1st Cir. 2014) (upward variance justified when case differs from the mine run of Guidelines cases)
- United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (appellate requirement: plausible sentencing rationale and defensible result)
- United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1991) (courts may consider reliable hearsay at sentencing)
- United States v. Ramírez-Negrón, 751 F.3d 42 (1st Cir.) (reliable hearsay admissible in sentencing)
- United States v. Serunjogi, 767 F.3d 132 (1st Cir. 2014) (multifaceted abuse-of-discretion standard in sentencing review)
- United States v. Leahy, 668 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2012) (standards of review for sentencing factual findings)
- United States v. Van, 87 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (implicit resolution of disputed facts at sentencing permissible)
