United States v. Nicholas Young
916 F.3d 368
4th Cir.2019Background
- Nicholas Young, a WMATA police officer, was investigated by the FBI for links to extremist causes and contacts with an informant (“Mo”) and an undercover agent (“Khalil”); he was charged with attempted material support to ISIL (18 U.S.C. § 2339B) and two counts of attempted obstruction of an official proceeding (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2)).
- Government evidence of predisposition included Nazi and white‑supremacist paraphernalia seized from Young’s home, witness testimony about his prior extremist sympathies, expert testimony on overlap between Nazism and militant Islamism, and communications with Mo including $245 in Google gift cards sent to facilitate encrypted communications.
- Young asserted entrapment to the material‑support charge and raised numerous evidentiary and discovery objections (scope of search warrant, Rule 401/403 relevance/prejudice, expert qualification, Jencks/Brady issues). He also moved for acquittal on the obstruction counts for insufficiency of evidence.
- The jury convicted Young on all counts; the district court sentenced him to concurrent 180‑month terms. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed contested evidentiary rulings, expert qualification, Jencks/Brady handling, sufficiency of obstruction evidence, and sentencing questions.
- The Fourth Circuit affirmed the § 2339B conviction, concluding the seized extremist materials and expert testimony were admissible and relevant to predisposition, but vacated the § 1512(c)(2) obstruction convictions for insufficient evidence of (a) a nexus to a particular official proceeding and (b) reasonable foreseeability of such a proceeding to Young, and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Young's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Nazi/white‑supremacist materials seized in warrant search | Seizure exceeded warrant scope and materials were irrelevant/prejudicial under Rules 401/403 | Warrant language was broad; materials corroborated predisposition and showed convergence between Nazism and militant Islamism; probative value outweighed prejudice | Affirmed: seizure within warrant scope and materials relevant and not unduly prejudicial when limited by jury instruction |
| Qualification/admissibility of expert on extremist “convergence” (Dr. Gartenstein‑Ross) | Expert lacking peer‑reviewed work and direct empirical studies; unreliable | Expert has extensive credentials and reliable social‑science methodology helpful to jury | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion under Rule 702/Daubert |
| Exclusion of purportedly exculpatory comments, agents’ internal communications, and Jencks/Brady disclosures | Excluded items and late Jencks production deprived him of fair trial; Brady violation/spoliation risk | Exclusions within discretion; late but non‑bad‑faith Jencks production remedied by continuance; no suppressed material favorable to defense | Affirmed: no reversible Jencks/Brady error; continuance appropriate sanction |
| Sufficiency of evidence for § 1512(c)(2) obstruction convictions | His misleading statements/texts were intended to impede an FBI inquiry and thus obstruct an official proceeding | Conduct intended to impede an investigation and foreseeability of later proceedings can be inferred | Vacated: government failed to prove nexus to a specific official proceeding (e.g., grand jury) and that such a proceeding was reasonably foreseeable to Young; § 1512(c)(2) requires those elements |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. McLaurin, 764 F.3d 372 (4th Cir.) (entrapment predisposition evidence standard)
- Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992) (predisposition must be shown prior to first government contact)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (expert testimony admissibility standard)
- United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir.) (social‑science expert methodology approved)
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (nexus requirement between obstructive act and judicial proceeding)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (reasonable‑foreseeability requirement for obstruction statutes)
- Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018) (interpretation of obstruction statutes and related mens rea requirements)