22 F. Supp. 3d 1158
D. Kan.2014Background
- Defendant’s pro se and counsel-enhanced motions challenged indictments on due process and speedy-trial grounds.
- Court ordered briefing on constitutional speedy-trial issue using Barker factors; statutory speedy-trial issues were discussed but not central.
- Over six-and-a-half years elapsed since indictment with no jury trial; co-defendant tried in 2010; significant delays occurred due to multiple periods of activity.
- Court identified seven delay periods, including complexity, competency proceedings, interlocutory appeal, health-related continuances, and pro se representation.
- Court weighed Barker factors and found a constitutional speedy-trial violation, concluding dismissal with prejudice was appropriate and the Second Superseding Indictment should be dismissed with prejudice.
- Status conferences canceled; pending motions denied as moot; the case terminated in favor of dismissal with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right was violated. | Gomez/Barker factors show excessive delay. | Delay largely attributable to government health issues and defense competency. | Yes; factors support a constitutional violation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (framework for evaluating speedy-trial rights across four factors)
- Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir.2009) (remedy for constitutional violation; weighs delays by government vs defense)
- Seltzer, 595 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir.2010) (analysis of Barker factors and prejudice)
- Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (U.S. 2009) (defendant delay due to defense/public defender system; equity in delaying blame)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (presumption of prejudice for long government negligence delays)
- United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515 (10th Cir.1995) (separates Speedy Trial Act analysis from Sixth Amendment analysis)