United States v. Nathaniel Worden, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14334

Worden pleaded guilty to advertising child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) and waived appellate rights in a comprehensive plea agreement.
The plea agreement included a broad waiver of the right to appeal conviction, sentence, or the manner of their imposition, with limited exceptions for ineffective assistance claims not related to the waiver.
Worden agreed to restitution for victims, acknowledging the district court would order restitution for the full amount of losses under 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b).
The government sought $533,244 in restitution on behalf of a victim named 'Amy' based on anticipated ongoing treatment costs.
The district court held a restitution hearing, accepted expert testimony alleging long-term therapy for Amy, and ordered payment of the full amount requested.
Worden challenged the amount, arguing speculative future treatment costs and lack of proximate causation, but the court did not impose a proximate-causation requirement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Worden's appellate waiver cover the restitution order itself?	Worden's waiver covers his conviction and sentence, including manner of imposition; restitution amount is part of the sentence.	The waiver should be read to bar appeals of the sentence but not necessarily the exact restitution amount, depending on waiver scope.	Yes; the waiver bars appeal of the restitution order and the amount.
Is the restitution amount reviewable when the waiver covers the sentence?	Because restitution is mandatory under § 2259 and part of the sentence, it is covered by the waiver.	Behrman suggests possible separation between waivers of 'sentence' and 'restitution amount' in some contexts.	The waiver bars all nonwaivable challenges to the restitution order.
Should proximate causation be required to support Amy's restitution amount?	Proximate-causation is not required; the district court rightly awarded full losses under § 2259.	The issue of causation is unsettled and the amount should be scrutinized.	The court need not decide causation here because the waiver precludes appeal.

United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2001) (waiver of appeal valid unless agreement annulled)
United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 2000) (waiver of 'sentence' may or may not include restitution; context matters)
United States v. Blinn, 490 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2007) (appeal waiver standards in plea agreements)
United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2005) (limits of plea agreement waivers in criminal cases)
United States v. Pearson, 570 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2009) (restitution-related appeals may survive where waiver language is ambiguous)
United States v. Oldimeji, 463 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2006) (no waiver where language implies separate challenge to sentence terms)
United States v. Sistrunk, 432 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2006) (no waiver where 'sentence' wording excludes restitution challenges)
United States v. Zink, 107 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 1997) (no waiver where 'any sentence' did not clearly include restitution)
United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 1996) (no waiver where restitution not explicitly included in 'any sentence')
In re Amy, 636 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2011) (proximate-causation issue in § 2259 varies by circuit)
United States v. Monzel, F.3d 2011 WL 1466365 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (district-court approach to causation in restitution context)
United States v. Feichtinger, 105 F.3d 1188 (7th Cir. 1997) (purpose of restitution waiver inquiry in light of statutory scheme)