United States v. Nathan Melton, 738 F.3d 903

Melton was convicted of bank fraud in 2009 and sentenced to 18 months in prison with 5 years of supervised release.
Melton’s supervised release was revoked three times, leading to a third revocation proceeding.
Approximately one month after discharge into supervised release, the Probation Office filed a non-compliance notice citing multiple violations.
A revocation hearing occurred on November 19, 2012; Melton’s formal lab test for synthetic marijuana was pending after a preliminary positive.
The district court held Melton in custody pending a second hearing; during the delay Melton resisted marshals, injuring one and damaging courtroom property.
The same judge presided over the rescheduled hearing; Melton admitted to existing violations and conceded that a new violation would be found by a preponderance if proved.
The district court sentenced Melton to 36 months’ imprisonment, stating dissatisfaction with Melton’s conduct and release obligations.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred by not recusing sua sponte	Melton argues judge’s impartiality was compromised by the November 19 disruption.	The district court did not show bias; no plain error in failing to recuse.	No plain-error recusal; no error in not recusing sua sponte.

United States v. Sypolt, 346 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2003) (plain-error standard for recusal denied)
United States v. Green, 701 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 2012) (plain-error standard for recusal elements)
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (Supreme Court, 1994) (bias requires extreme disposition; not mere irritation)
United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2006) (disposition toward fairness; disqualifying bias must be shown)
United States v. Martinez, 446 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2006) (burden on recusal movant to rebut impartiality presumption)
United States v. Estey, 595 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2010) (no recusal where no more information than parties; disclosure in courtroom duties)
Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1985) (knowledge gained through judicial functions is not disqualifying)
Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432 F.3d 437 (2d Cir. 2005) (informational knowledge from court duties not disqualifying)
Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2002) (impartiality judged by reasonable observer standard)
In re Kan. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353 (8th Cir. 1996) (application of 28 U.S.C. § 455 analysis framework)