United States v. Nastri
647 F. App'x 51
2d Cir.2016Background
- Nastri was convicted by a jury in the District of Vermont of conspiracy to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment.
- Appellant challenges the conviction on multiple grounds after the February 2015 judgment of conviction.
- First, he claims a juror was prejudiced when she learned, via a third party, that another juror was excused after seeing Nastri in shackles.
- Second, he argues the prosecutor’s summation remarks were improper and prejudicial.
- Third, he contends the district court erred in applying the criminal livelihood enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(15)(E).
- Fourth, he argues the Guideline’s pattern-of-criminal-conduct definition is vague, and the district court’s two-year distribution period falls within that vagueness
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juror prejudice due to second-hand shackles notice | Nastri maintains Deck extends to this scenario | Nastri argues juror was prejudiced by third-hand information | No reversible error; no specific harm shown; impartiality claimed not demonstrated |
| Prosecutor's summation remarks | Remarks were improper and prejudicial | Comments were vigorous advocacy, not prejudicial rhetoric | No plain error; comments not coercive or improper to warrant reversal |
| Criminal livelihood enhancement application | Income sources beyond crime, like family support, count toward occupation | Guideline requires primary occupation; no non-occupational income applicable | District court did not err; evidence showed income from drug enterprise exceeding $14,500 and related occupation |
| Vagueness of pattern-of-criminal-conduct standard | Term ‘substantial period of time’ vague | Guideline is not vague as applied | No plain error; standard sufficiently definite for real-world conduct |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Torres, 519 F.2d 723 (2d Cir.1975) (brief glimpse of defendant outside courtroom not reversible without harm)
- Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (U.S. 2005) (presumption of prejudice for in-court shackling scenarios; not extended here)
- United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2000) (plain-error standard for reviewed prosecutorial comments)
- United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.1992) (vigorous advocacy allowed; no prejudice analyzed here)
- United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338 (2d Cir.1996) (limits on calling statements 'hog wash' or 'red herring')
- United States v. Jaswal, 47 F.3d 539 (2d Cir.1995) (limits on accusations that defense counsel is unethical)
- VIP of Berlin, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179 (2d Cir.2010) (as-applied vagueness analysis for substantial standard)
- United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.1993) (prosecutorial discretion in argument and reasonable inferences)
- United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir.1993) (prosecutorial argument reasonable inferences allowed)