United States v. Narvaez-Soto
773 F.3d 282
| 1st Cir. | 2014Background
- Defendant Edwin E. Narváez-Soto pled guilty to carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury (18 U.S.C. § 2119(2)) and to carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)).
- Criminal conduct: defendant and an accomplice followed and carjacked a woman, abducted and held her hostage, forced her to make bank withdrawals, then defendant drove her to a secluded spot and raped her; victim later left in the abandoned car after a police chase in which officers fired at the vehicle.
- PSR guideline calculation for count 1 produced offense level 29, Criminal History III, GSR 108–135 months after various enhancements and a 3-level acceptance reduction.
- Count 2 carried a mandatory consecutive 7-year minimum; the PSR characterized that count as "precluded from the guidelines."
- At sentencing the district court adopted the PSR, articulated aggravating facts (planning, stalking, abduction, rape, risk to officers, terrorizing victim/family), and imposed an upward variance: 240 months on count 1 plus 120 months consecutive on count 2 (total 360 months). Defendant appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Narváez-Soto) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by considering Puerto Rico crime rates | Court may consider community crime incidence to inform deterrence and sentencing | Use of Puerto Rico crime prevalence was improper and factually unsupported | No abuse — community crime incidence is a legitimate sentencing factor and court’s factual references were supported by record and experience |
| Whether court focused improperly on community concerns over individual characteristics | Emphasized the offense's depravity and individualized facts warranting variance | Court over-weighted community/systemic concerns and under-weighted defendant’s individual characteristics | No error — court primarily relied on specific aggravating offense conduct and individualized assessment |
| Whether sentencing on Count 2 required guideline-based explanation (USSG §2K2.4(b)) | Court intended to vary on both counts and recognized mandatory minimum; upward variance justified | For the first time on appeal, defendant argued the statutory minimum should have been treated as guideline and required explanation for exceeding it | Plain-error review fails — defendant didn’t show reasonable probability of a different outcome; no reversible error |
| Whether the overall sentence was substantively unreasonable (excessive) | Upward variance warranted by heinous, atypical facts; sentence within range of reasonable outcomes | Variance duplicative of guideline factors and insufficiently particularized; outside the heartland | Substantively reasonable — court provided a plausible, particularized rationale; sentence not greater than necessary |
Key Cases Cited
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (sentencing courts must consider guidelines as starting point and make individualized assessment)
- United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d 229 (1st Cir. 2014) (community crime incidence may inform deterrence and sentencing)
- United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2013) (collecting cases on community considerations and deterrence)
- United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212 (1st Cir. 2011) (upward adjustments/variances permissible when conduct is atypically aggravated)
- United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (deferential abuse-of-discretion standard and need for plausible sentencing rationale)
- United States v. King, 741 F.3d 305 (1st Cir. 2014) (recognizing a broad universe of reasonable sentences)