United States v. Nagell
911 F.3d 23
1st Cir.2018Background
- Michael Nagell, a federal sex-offender registrant, was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) for knowingly failing to update his sex-offender registration (employment info) between Dec. 2015 and Apr. 2016; a jury convicted him.
- Nagell had moved from a halfway house (Pharos House) to a private residence and had begun full-time employment at Noyes on Dec. 21, 2015; registry forms filed Dec. 28–Jan. 13 listed Emery‑Waterhouse as his employer.
- At trial Nagell testified he did not update the Registry because his Pharos House case manager, Kim Hartley, told him she would handle updates and that he relied on that assurance; he also claimed an unrecorded Bath Police Dept. visit on Jan. 13, 2016 where additional information was allegedly provided.
- Government rebuttal witnesses (Hartley and Detective Booth) directly contradicted Nagell: Hartley denied ever promising to update registrations; Booth testified Bath PD had no record of a Jan. 13 visit or scanned form consistent with Nagell’s account.
- At sentencing the district judge found Nagell committed perjury (falsity, materiality, willfulness) and applied a two-level U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement, raising his offense level and resulting in a 30‑month sentence (middle of Guidelines range).
- On appeal Nagell challenged the perjury finding and enhancement as clearly erroneous; the First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court clearly erred in finding Nagell committed perjury at trial | Government: Nagell’s testimony contradicted unrebutted documentary and testimonial evidence; false statements were material and willful, supporting § 3C1.1 enhancement | Nagell: testimony reflected differing recollections or mistake; ambiguities should be resolved for defendant, not treated as perjury | Court: Affirmed — judge’s credibility findings were supported; falsity, materiality, and willfulness satisfied by preponderance of evidence |
| Whether the § 3C1.1 enhancement can be applied when defendant testified | Government: enhancement applies when defendant willfully commits perjury despite testifying | Nagell: applying enhancement punishes exercise of right to testify or relies only on jury rejection | Court: Enhancement permissible when perjury proven; district court properly made credibility/findings; right to testify not impeded absent perjury |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (perjury standard for § 3C1.1; must be false, material, and willful)
- United States v. Mercer, 834 F.3d 39 (1st Cir.) (sentencing court must find elements of perjury; single finding sufficient)
- United States v. Matiz, 14 F.3d 79 (1st Cir.) (materiality and perjury-element requirement for § 3C1.1)
- United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302 (1st Cir.) (enhancement not automatic just because jury rejects defendant; evidentiary conflicts insufficient alone)
- United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221 (1st Cir.) (falsity may be shown circumstantially)
- United States v. D'Andrea, 107 F.3d 949 (1st Cir.) (single finding of perjury can support enhancement)
- United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5 (1st Cir.) (district court who presided over trial has latitude in credibility assessments)