United States v. Murphy
2015 CAAF LEXIS 767
| C.A.A.F. | 2015Background
- Appellant (Murphy) pled guilty to conspiracy and larceny for stealing ~5,000 rounds of 5.56 mm military ammunition; sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement (reduced by convening authority), and reduction in grade.
- The charge and plea identified the stolen ammunition as “explosives,” triggering a harsher sentencing cap under the MCM’s larceny aggravator for firearms/explosives.
- At providence inquiry, the military judge defined “explosives,” asked about an Army regulation classifying small-arms ammunition as explosives, and the appellant acknowledged that he knew the ammunition was explosive.
- On appeal the Army Court of Criminal Appeals held ammunition falls within R.C.M. 103(11)’s definition of “explosive” (which incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 844(j) and § 232(5)), and affirmed the findings and sentence as modified.
- This Court granted review limited to whether the ACCA erred in concluding ammunition is an “explosive” for the MCM sentence aggravator and whether the guilty plea was provident.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Murphy) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 5.56 mm ammunition is an “explosive” under R.C.M. 103(11) | Ammunition is not an explosive; including it would overreach the text and raise ambiguity that favors the accused | R.C.M. 103(11) explicitly lists gunpowders/smokeless powders and incorporates §844(j)/§232(5), so ammunition (contains gunpowder, is expelled by explosive action, and is regulated in §844) fits the definition | Court held R.C.M. 103(11) includes ammunition as an explosive as a matter of law |
| Whether the military judge’s providence colloquy was deficient for failing to recite §844(j)/§232(5) and for citing AR 75-14 | Failure to cite the federal definitions and reliance on a non-incorporated Army regulation rendered the plea improvident | The judge adequately explained elements; appellant admitted all facts and repeatedly acknowledged ammunition as explosive; any omission did not create a substantial basis to withdraw plea | Court held plea was provident; omissions did not create a substantial basis in law or fact to question it |
| Whether precedent (e.g., Graham) forecloses treating small-arms cartridges as explosives | Relied on Graham (2d Cir.) that a single cartridge was not an explosive for §844(h)(1) purposes | Graham is fact-specific and explicitly limited; large quantities and military context distinguish this case | Court declined to follow Graham’s narrower holding; found no conflict given differing facts |
| Whether MCM sentence aggravator properly applies absent an allegation of monetary value | Argued sentence enhancement cannot rest on categorization without value allegation | MCM allows an alternative aggravator: any firearm or explosive regardless of alleged monetary value; ammunition was charged as explosive | Court upheld applicability of the MCM aggravator as applied here |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (standard for reviewing guilty pleas and substantial-basis test)
- United States v. Kearns, 73 M.J. 177 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (statutory interpretation principles applied in military justice)
- United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (U.S. 1981) (look first to statutory language when determining scope)
- United States v. Graham, 691 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2012) (held a single cartridge was not an "explosive" in that factual context; limited by its facts)
- United States v. Davis, 202 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluded gunpowder/ammunition can fall within §844(j)’s definition of explosive)
- Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities of a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (U.S. 1995) (canons supporting expansive/inclusive statutory reading)