United States v. Mumme, 985 F.3d 25

Background

Homeland Security agents and Maine police went to Ryan Mumme’s Eastport property after records showed he wired over $16,000 to accounts (including payments to a suspected Philippines child‑porn producer) and used the email dexter.rick@yahoo.com for payments; an on‑scene recording captured the encounter.
Officers approached on a dirt road/field area near the house; Mumme's father objected and said they needed a warrant, but he was not restrained and did not assert ownership of the dirt road.
Mumme initially refused a device search; Det. Tupper told him officers would either secure the house and seek a warrant or Mumme could hand over devices so the officers could seek a warrant (they would return devices if a judge rejected the warrant); officers said Mumme could not reenter the house while they secured it.
After being told those choices and after officers briefly secured the scene, Mumme allowed seizure of his computer and hard drive; the officers then read limited Miranda warnings and Mumme made incriminating admissions; a search warrant issued and the search uncovered numerous child‑pornography images and videos.
Mumme was indicted, moved to suppress (challenging voluntariness of consent, curtilage intrusion, and custodial interrogation), lost the suppression motion, entered a conditional guilty plea, unsuccessfully moved to withdraw the plea (claiming ineffective assistance), was sentenced, and appealed.
The First Circuit affirmed: consent to seize the devices was voluntary, the officers did not intrude on the curtilage, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a hearing on Mumme’s renewed plea‑withdrawal motion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't)	Defendant's Argument (Mumme)	Held
Voluntariness of consent to seize electronic devices	Consent was voluntary; officers accurately told Mumme they would seek a warrant if he refused; they reasonably believed they had probable cause and offered lawful options.	Consent was coerced by threat to seize the home, refusal to allow reentry, and pressure to surrender devices.	Consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances; officers’ statements were accurate and not coercive; securing the home pending a warrant was lawful under McArthur.
Whether officers entered curtilage / trespassed when questioning Mumme	Conversation occurred in an open field area outside curtilage; officers had implied license to approach; father’s objections did not create Mumme’s standing to suppress.	Officers intruded on curtilage without a warrant, making the subsequent seizure and statements tainted.	No curtilage intrusion: field was open, visible, unenclosed; even absent counsel’s concession, no plain‑error shown.
Denial of renewed motion to withdraw guilty plea (ineffective assistance / evidentiary hearing)	District court properly denied the motion without a hearing because Mumme merely sought to relitigate suppression; allegations would not entitle relief.	Counsel was ineffective for failing to develop curtilage/trespass arguments, entitling Mumme to withdraw and an evidentiary hearing.	Denial was not an abuse of discretion; no ‘‘fair and just reason’’ to withdraw; evidentiary hearing unnecessary—claims can be pursued in collateral relief.

Key Cases Cited

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent validity assessed under totality of circumstances; no requirement to be advised of right to refuse).
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent vitiated by false claim of lawful authority).
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (police may temporarily secure home to prevent destruction of evidence while they obtain a warrant).
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (curtilage is part of the home; but police have implied license to approach and knock).
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (co‑occupant’s contemporaneous objection can prevent entry by another occupant’s consent).
United States v. Vázquez, 724 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2013) (accurate assurance that a warrant will be sought does not necessarily render consent involuntary).
United States v. Pérez‑Montañez, 202 F.3d 434 (1st Cir. 2000) (consent governed by totality of circumstances; consent need not be preceded by advisal of right to refuse).
United States v. Pérez‑Díaz, 848 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2017) (temporary seizure of premises pending a warrant can be reasonable under McArthur where officers have probable cause).
Dunn v. United States, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (four‑factor test for determining curtilage: proximity, enclosure, use, and steps to protect from observation).