944 F.3d 1
1st Cir.2019Background
- Moran stored closed, opaque black garbage bags containing his belongings in his sister Alysha's storage unit.
- While Moran was jailed on a different matter he called Alysha and asked her to move his bags; police learned of the call and went to Alysha's residence.
- Alysha gave oral consent and signed a written Consent for Search authorizing searches of her apartment, car, and storage unit; she identified the black bags as Moran's but did not explicitly authorize opening them.
- Officers removed the closed bags, a canine (not trained for fentanyl) did not alert, then officers opened the bags without a warrant and discovered fentanyl.
- The district court denied Moran's motion to suppress (initially relying on actual authority; on reconsideration relying on apparent authority). The First Circuit held the government failed to prove actual or apparent authority, reversed the denial of reconsideration, vacated Moran's conviction, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actual authority to consent to search closed bags | Government: Alysha had common authority/mutual use of containers (based on recorded calls, her access to storage, and consent form), so she could validly consent. | Moran: No evidence Alysha had mutual use or permission to open closed containers; mere possession in her unit and a prior call do not show shared privacy interest. | Court: Government failed to meet its burden to show Alysha had mutual use or shared privacy interest; no actual authority. |
| Apparent authority (reasonable belief by officers) | Government: Officers reasonably relied on Alysha's written/oral consent, lack of objection during the search, and the recorded calls to form an objectively reasonable belief she had authority. | Moran: Alysha expressly said the bags belonged to him; that ambiguity required further inquiry before searching closed containers. | Court: Belief was not objectively reasonable given Alysha's statements and ambiguity; officers should have further investigated; apparent authority lacking; suppression appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Matlock, [citation="415 U.S. 164"] (U.S. 1974) (third-party consent requires common authority based on mutual use)
- Illinois v. Rodriguez, [citation="497 U.S. 177"] (U.S. 1990) (apparent authority turns on whether officers reasonably believed consenter had authority)
- Katz v. United States, [citation="389 U.S. 347"] (U.S. 1967) (warrant requirement and expectation of privacy principles)
- United States v. Meada, [citation="408 F.3d 14"] (1st Cir. 2005) (explains common-authority/mutual-use test for third-party consent)
- United States v. Infante-Ruiz, [citation="13 F.3d 498"] (1st Cir. 1994) (consent to vehicle search did not extend to another’s closed container when ownership was disclosed)
- United States v. Casey, [citation="825 F.3d 1"] (1st Cir. 2016) (government bears burden to show mutual use for actual authority)
- United States v. Peyton, [citation="745 F.3d 546"] (D.C. Cir. 2014) (officers must investigate ambiguous third-party consent rather than proceed without clarification)