65 F.4th 30
1st Cir.2023Background
- Morales pleaded guilty to one count of using a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)) arising from a carjacking; the government dismissed a separate carjacking count under the plea deal.
- The presentence report (PSR) tied Morales to a daylight gang shootout and two near-consecutive carjackings (a Toyota Prius and the charged green Mitsubishi Lancer), with multiple innocent victims and visible blood trails; Morales admitted driving the Lancer.
- The PSR was not challenged at sentencing; the district court relied on it as the record basis for relevant-conduct findings.
- The district court imposed 108 months (24 months above the 84-month guideline minimum) and five years supervised release, including a special Therapy Condition requiring participation in CBT and related services "until satisfactorily discharged by the service provider, with the approval of the probation officer."
- Morales appealed, arguing (1) the upward variance was procedurally unreasonable because of weak/misstated factual support and (2) the Therapy Condition unlawfully delegated judicial authority to probation; because he did not preserve these arguments, the court reviewed for plain error.
- The First Circuit affirmed: the PSR supported the district court’s factual findings and the Therapy Condition did not constitute impermissible delegation under controlling precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procedural reasonableness of upward variance (24 months) | Morales: district court relied on weak/mischaracterized PSR facts (presence at shootout and Prius carjacking; rifle possession) so variance was unsupported | United States: PSR facts were unchallenged and supported relevant-conduct findings; court’s inferences were reasonable | No plain error; PSR supported findings and variance upheld |
| Delegation of supervised-release Therapy Condition | Morales: condition left duration/final discharge to probation, unlawfully delegating judicial power | United States: court imposed the treatment requirement and delegated only administrative details to probation; precedents allow such delegation | No plain error; condition permissible (court retained ultimate sentencing authority) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. González, 857 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2017) (use of plea/PSR record for sentencing facts)
- United States v. Alejandro-Rosado, 878 F.3d 435 (1st Cir. 2017) (plain-error review for procedural reasonableness)
- United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211 (1st Cir. 2005) (standards for supervised-release condition review)
- United States v. Allen, 312 F.3d 512 (1st Cir. 2002) (approving delegation of administrative details of mental-health treatment to probation)
- United States v. Meléndez-Santana, 353 F.3d 93 (1st Cir. 2003) (limits on delegation where court must set certain maxima)
- United States v. González-Rodríguez, 859 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2017) (failure to object to PSR facts operates as admission)
- United States v. González-Andino, 58 F.4th 563 (1st Cir. 2023) (high bar for plain-error challenge to unrequested factual findings)
- United States v. Cox, 851 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2017) (PSR admissions and sentencing objections)
- United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001) (permitting delegation of scheduling/provider selection to probation when court orders mandatory therapy)
- United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2014) (cognitive behavioral therapy is appropriate for defendants with substance-abuse histories)
- United States v. Mercado, 777 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 2015) (defendant may seek district-court modification if probation abuses delegated discretion)