United States v. Moon
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16656
1st Cir.2015Background
- Police obtained warrants after a CI and surveillance allegedly linked Moon to recent controlled buys and to a green Mercedes registered to his girlfriend; officers executed warrants at 99 Ormond Street and found drugs, paraphernalia, personal documents, and a loaded .357 revolver under the bedroom mattress.
- State drug counts were dismissed because state lab testing was tainted; federal case proceeded on a single count: felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
- Pretrial motions: Moon sought suppression, a Franks hearing, in camera review of CI materials, and limits on the government’s use of drug evidence and officer opinion testimony; the district court denied those requests but allowed drug evidence and officers’ lay-opinion testimony for limited purposes.
- At trial Moon admitted ownership of drug paraphernalia and that drugs were in the bedroom; he denied the gun belonged to him and denied dealing drugs, testifying some friends used the room.
- Jury convicted on the firearms charge; district court applied ACCA predicates and sentenced Moon to 220 months. Moon appealed, raising evidentiary and sentencing challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Moon) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of drug evidence and related cross-examination (Rules 404(b), 403) | Drug evidence was unfairly prejudicial and improperly used to show propensity to possess a gun. | Evidence was relevant to dominion/control of the room and motive (protecting drugs/money); limiting instructions would mitigate prejudice. | Admission was not an abuse of discretion: probative of control/motive and limiting instructions sufficed. |
| Use of nearly-10‑year-old robbery conviction for impeachment (Rule 609 / opened-door) | Admission was prejudicial and improperly balanced under Rule 609. | Moon opened the door by testifying about the robbery; cross-examination to contradict his account was permissible. | Court did not abuse discretion—door opened and contradiction permitted despite Rule 609 concerns. |
| Officer opinion testimony identifying drugs and stating dealers often possess guns (Rule 701/702) | Such testimony was improper expert testimony or unduly prejudicial. | Officers had particularized knowledge from extensive experience; testimony admissible as lay opinion under Rule 701 (or as expert if disclosed). | Admission was within discretion under First Circuit precedent treating such testimony as permissible lay opinion. |
| Disclosure of CI identity / in camera review / Franks hearing | Court erred by refusing CI disclosure, in camera review of warrant materials, and a Franks hearing to test affidavit truthfulness. | Government asserted qualified informant privilege and did not rely on CI testimony at trial; defendant failed to show disclosure was essential or to make a substantial Franks showing. | No abuse of discretion: Moon waived identity claim and failed to make the substantial preliminary showing required for Franks or for in camera review; nondisclosure not reversible error. |
| ACCA enhancement and jury-trial right | ACCA predicates that increased sentence must be charged to jury under Alleyne. | Prior convictions need not be submitted to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt for sentencing enhancements (Almendarez‑Torres). | Enhancement proper: prior convictions may be relied on at sentencing without jury factfinding; ACCA applied correctly. |
Key Cases Cited
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing of intentional or reckless falsity to obtain a Franks hearing)
- Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (government has qualified privilege to withhold informant identity; disclosure required only when informant is relevant and essential to defense)
- Almendarez‑Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (prior convictions may be proven at sentencing and need not be submitted to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
- United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2012) (law‑enforcement lay‑opinion testimony based on particularized experience can be admissible under Rule 701)
- United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2002) (evidence of drug dealing at a location is relevant as motive for possessing a gun)
- United States v. Tetioukhine, 725 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013) (defendant’s testimony can open the door to cross‑examination on prior convictions or conduct)
- United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (drug dealing evidence can supply motive to possess a firearm)
- United States v. DiRosa, 761 F.3d 144 (1st Cir. 2014) (district court evidentiary rulings under Rules 404(b) and 403 reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- United States v. Mills, 710 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (Roviaro balancing and defendant’s burden to show disclosure is essential)
