578 F.Supp.3d 54
D.D.C.2021Background
- On Jan. 6, 2021 Congress convened a joint session to certify Electoral College votes under the Twelfth Amendment and 3 U.S.C. § 15; the session was suspended for >5½ hours after a mob breached the Capitol.
- Defendants Patrick Montgomery and Brady Knowlton are alleged to have entered the Capitol, confronted police, went into the Senate gallery, and engaged in forceful conduct; they are charged in a ten-count second superseding indictment including Count 10: obstruction of an official proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).
- Count 10 alleges Defendants “corruptly obstruct[ed], influence[d], or imped[ed]” Congress’s certification of the Electoral College vote (or attempted to do so).
- Defendants moved to dismiss Count 10 on three grounds: (1) the certification is not an “official proceeding”; (2) § 1512(c)(2) only covers interference with evidence/its availability (not physical obstruction of the proceeding); and (3) the statute is unconstitutionally vague/overbroad as applied.
- The Court’s review was limited to the face of the indictment and legal sufficiency; the Court concluded the certification is an “official proceeding,” § 1512(c)(2) reaches corrupt obstruction of that proceeding (not limited to evidence-tampering), and the statute is not unconstitutionally vague or substantially overbroad as applied; the motion to dismiss Count 10 was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Montgomery/Knowlton) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Is Congress’s Jan. 6 certification an “official proceeding” under § 1515/1512? | Yes — §1515(a)(1)(B) defines a proceeding before Congress and the Electoral Count Act creates a formal, adjudicative-like joint session. | No — “proceeding” should be limited to quasi‑judicial, court‑like or administration‑of‑justice congressional activities. | Yes — joint session to certify electoral votes is an “official proceeding.” |
| 2. Does § 1512(c)(2) cover obstruction aimed at the proceeding itself (including physical interference), or only acts impairing evidence availability/integrity? | Broad reading: §1512(c)(2)’s plain language reaches corrupt acts that obstruct, influence, or impede any official proceeding, not limited to evidence tampering. | Narrow reading: the residual “otherwise” and statutory context limit §1512(c)(2) to the same species of conduct as §1512(c)(1) (evidence‑related). | Broad reading — §1512(c)(2) criminalizes corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding itself; it is not limited to evidence‑tampering. |
| 3. Is § 1512(c)(2) unconstitutionally vague as applied (esp. “corruptly” and mens rea)? | No — courts read a nexus requirement and a corruptly element (improper purpose/consciousness of wrongdoing); established canons and precedent provide adequate notice. | Yes — prior D.C. Cir. authority (Poindexter) and alleged vagueness risk leave defendants without fair notice and risk arbitrary enforcement. | No — statute (as construed to require a nexus to a particular proceeding and corrupt intent) gives fair notice and limits arbitrary enforcement. |
| 4. Is § 1512(c)(2) facially overbroad under the First Amendment? | No — the statute, as construed, targets corrupt obstruction of proceedings and requires wrongful intent; it does not substantially reach protected expression. | Yes — the statute could chill or criminalize protected speech/assembly and overlap with misdemeanor Capitol statutes. | No — defendants failed to show a substantial amount of protected expressive activity within the statute’s legitimate sweep. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (adopted a nexus requirement for omnibus obstruction clauses: conduct must naturally and probably affect a proceeding and the actor must know it likely would)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (interpreting “corruptly” and requiring proper jury instruction on corrupt persuasion and nexus to a proceeding)
- Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (applied noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis to limit a related evidentiary‑spoliation statute’s scope)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (discussion of the role of the word “otherwise” in residual statutory clauses)
- United States v. Ermoian, 752 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2013) (analysis of “official proceeding” in a different context; rejected overly broad definitions)
- United States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2008) (interpreting §1515(a)(1)(C) agency‑proceeding language and formal convocation requirement)
- United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (D.C. Circuit’s vagueness concerns about “corruptly” under §1505; discussed but distinguished)
- Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018) (required nexus between conduct and a particular administrative proceeding under a separate obstruction statute)
- United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (upheld §1512(c)(2) conviction for conduct that interfered with a judicial proceeding)
- United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (contextual appellate decision addressing Jan. 6 defendants and related legal issues)