United States v. Montarico Johnson, 756 F.3d 532

Montarico Johnson was convicted by a jury of distributing ~3 grams of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release.
During jury selection the government used peremptory strikes including two female venirepersons; defense raised a Batson/J.E.B. gender-discrimination challenge which the district court found did not meet a prima facie showing.
Johnson sought a downward variance from the career-offender–driven guidelines range (210–240 months), citing family circumstances and a Sentencing Commission study; the court rejected the variance and imposed 210 months.
The written judgment included special conditions of supervised release requiring participation in sex-offender treatment, possible sex-offender evaluation, alcohol-dependence treatment with abstinence, and computer/search conditions; some of these (alcohol, searches) were not mentioned in the oral pronouncement.
The only sex-related conviction in Johnson’s record was a 1997 Illinois misdemeanor (he was 17 and had sex with a girl >13 but <17); no jail time and no later sex-offense history.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and prison term; vacated the sex-offender treatment condition and other supervised-release terms inconsistent with the oral sentence; remanded for entry of a corrected judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Johnson)	Defendant's Argument (Gov.)	Held
Peremptory strikes (gender/Batson)	Government struck female jurors based on gender; district court should have evaluated prosecutor’s stated reasons for pretext	No prima facie showing of gender discrimination; record shows strikes evenly split and more strikes against men overall	Affirmed: no prima facie case; no Batson inquiry required beyond that finding
Variance from career-offender guideline	District court failed to sufficiently consider variance arguments (including USSC study)	Court considered arguments and §3553(a) factors and rejected variance due to extensive criminal history	Affirmed: judge understood and rejected request; no remand required
Sex-offender treatment as supervised-release condition	No nexus between a 15‑year‑old misdemeanor and need for sex-offender treatment; condition was imposed without notice or record support	Court could consider prior sexual-charge facts and modify later if probation officer deems unnecessary	Reversed: condition vacated—no adequate §3553(a) nexus or recent sexual misconduct to justify mandatory treatment
Conditions inconsistent with oral pronouncement	Written judgment added alcohol-treatment/abstinence and computer-search conditions not announced at sentencing	Government conceded error as to consistency with oral sentence	Reversed: those written conditions vacated; remand for corrected judgment

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (established three-step test for discriminatory peremptory strikes)
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (Batson extended to gender-based peremptory strikes)
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (requirement for trial court findings on credibility of prosecutor’s reasons in some Batson denials)
United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2009) (Batson prima facie and credibility analysis guidance)
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (requirement that sentencing court show it considered parties’ arguments)
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct if proved by preponderance)
United States v. Evans, 727 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2013) (vacatur of sex-offender condition where sexual misconduct was too remote; need for nexus to §3553(a))
Harris v. Hardy, 680 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (factors bearing on prima facie showing for group-based strikes)
United States v. Waltower, 643 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2011) (consideration of acquitted conduct in sentencing context)
United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 2001) (vacating sex-treatment condition where supporting sexual-offense was remote)
United States v. Diekamper, 604 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 2010) (court need not explicitly recount every mitigating argument if clearly considered)