United States v. Montanez-Quinones, 911 F.3d 59

DHS agents traced a child-pornography video downloaded via the Ares peer-to-peer network to Ricardo Montañez-Quiñones's residence; agents seized a laptop and desktop.
Forensic analysis found thousands of child-sex-abuse files: 1,072 images on the devices, additional erased/incomplete downloads, and files present in Ares "shared" folders.
Montañez pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography under a non-binding plea agreement that stipulated an offense level of 28 (including a 2-level distribution enhancement) and contemplated a hypothetical Guidelines range of 78–97 months; government agreed to recommend no more than 87 months.
The PSI calculated a higher offense level (30) based on 600+ images; the district court adopted the PSI calculations and sentenced Montañez to 109 months.
On appeal Montañez argued (1) the government breached the plea agreement by its sentencing advocacy and a misstated images figure, and (2) the district court erred in applying the §2G2.2(b)(3)(F) two-level enhancement for "knowing distribution" because the government failed to prove he knew Ares' file-sharing properties.
The First Circuit majority affirmed: no breach (government repeatedly recommended 87 months and advocacy was within its reserved right) and no clear error in finding knowledge (inference from defendant's computer sophistication and selective files in shared folder). A partial dissent would have vacated the enhancement as insufficiently supported.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the government breach the plea agreement by its sentencing advocacy or misstating the stipulated image range?	Government: it repeatedly recommended the agreed 87 months; the misstatement was inadvertent and did not undermine the recommendation.	Montañez: prosecutor's harsh advocacy and misstated images number undercut the government's promise to recommend the bargained-for sentence.	No breach: prosecutor affirmed the agreed recommendation multiple times; advocacy for a higher sentence within reserved rights was permissible; misstatement was inadvertent and not prejudicial.
Did the district court clearly err in applying the two-level §2G2.2(b)(3)(F) enhancement for "knowing distribution"?	Government: knowledge may be inferred circumstantially; defendant's computer degrees, long-time use, and placement of files in a shared folder support inference he knew Ares shared files.	Montañez: record lacks proof he knew Ares' default sharing behavior or that he intentionally put/kept files in shared folders rather than automatic placement; inference of allocation is speculative.	Majority: affirmed enhancement — inference of knowledge was plausible based on defendant's sophistication and selective files in shared folder. Dissent: would reverse — record lacks specific evidence of allocation or awareness of Ares' sharing defaults.

United States v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (plain-error framework and standards for plea-breach review)
United States v. Gonczy, 357 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2004) (prosecutor bound to plea promises; evaluation of government advocacy)
United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263 (1st Cir. 1992) (no specific formula required for prosecutor's compliance with recommendation)
United States v. Cates, 897 F.3d 349 (1st Cir. 2018) (mens rea for distribution may be proven circumstantially; examples of adequate evidence of knowledge)
United States v. Carroll, 886 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2018) (reversed where government failed to prove defendant knew Ares automatically shared downloads)
United States v. Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 2014) (totality-of-circumstances test for prosecutorial conduct at sentencing)