982 F.3d 648
9th Cir.2020Background:
- On July 19, 2015, Monique Lozoya slapped a fellow passenger on a Delta flight from Minneapolis to Los Angeles; the plane landed at LAX and the FBI charged her with misdemeanor assault in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States.
- Lozoya was tried in the Central District of California (the landing district). After the government rested she moved for acquittal arguing venue was improper; the magistrate and district court denied relief and convicted her; a divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed on venue; the court granted rehearing en banc.
- The majority held that in‑flight federal offenses fall under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)’s second paragraph (offenses involving interstate transportation are continuing offenses) and that venue is proper in the flight’s landing district.
- The majority reasoned the Constitution (Article III and the Sixth Amendment) does not require treating state/district airspace as the State/district for venue purposes and deferred to Congress’s statute to fix venue for in‑flight crimes.
- A dissent (Ikuta, joined by Collins and Lee) concurred in the judgment but argued § 3238—not § 3237(a)—controls: crimes committed in navigable airspace are “not committed within any State,” so venue is where the offender is arrested or first brought (or last known residence).
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov) | Defendant's Argument (Lozoya / Dissent) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper statutory venue for in‑flight federal crimes | §3237(a) applies; offenses "involving" interstate transportation are continuing and may be prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which the flight moved (landing district) | Venue must be the federal district located under the plane at the moment of the offense (flyover district) | Majority: §3237(a) governs; landing‑district venue is proper |
| Constitutional venue under Article III & Sixth Amendment | Constitution does not treat state/district airspace as the State/district for venue; when crime is not within any State Congress may direct venue | Constitution requires trial where crime was committed; airspace should be treated as outside State territory so the Venue Clause exception applies and Congress must specify venue (per §3238) | Majority: Constitution does not limit venue to flyover district; Congress may fix venue by statute; dissent: airspace is outside a State for Venue Clause purposes and §3238 controls |
| Whether §3237(a) or §3238 supplies venue for in‑flight point‑in‑time offenses | §3237(a)’s continuing‑offense provision fits in‑flight offenses because they occur on interstate transportation | §3238 governs because crimes in navigable airspace are "elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district" and thus must be tried where offender is arrested/first brought | Majority: §3237(a) applies; Dissent: §3238 is the proper statutory vehicle |
| Policy and practical implications | Landing‑district rule is practical, aligns with near‑universal practice, aids victims/witnesses and prosecution | Majority reading of §3237(a) risks sweeping point‑in‑time offenses into broad venue and raising constitutional problems; prefer limiting venue to arrest/first‑brought district | Majority: practical benefits and circuit precedent favor landing‑district rule; dissent warns constitutional overbreadth and prefers §3238 approach |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1973) (held navigable airspace above a district is part of that district for venue purposes in prior circuit precedent)
- United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944) (discussed unfairness of remote venue and occasioned congressional venue reform for continuing offenses)
- United States v. Rodriguez‑Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999) (defines continuing‑offense doctrine and when distinct parts allow venue in multiple districts)
- United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2004) (applied §3237(a) to uphold landing‑district venue for in‑flight offenses)
- United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2012) (same: §3237(a) supports landing‑district prosecutions for in‑flight crimes)
- United States v. Pace, 314 F.3d 344 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussed §3238 and its application to offenses committed outside the United States)
- United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (recognized limits to the old common‑law notion that land ownership extends indefinitely upward and addressed navigable airspace issues)